For more context on why I thought that link would have been helpful: In Go you download dependencies "straight" from the source[1], while in npm and other languages you download dependencies from a completely unrelated registry that can have any random code (i.e. whether the published artifact was built from the alleged source repository, is a flip of a coin).

So not having this kind of third party registry eliminates the point of failure that caused the issue commented in the article. The issue was caught because of a centralized place, yes, but it was also caused because npm dependencies are downloaded from a centralized place and because this centralized place only hosts artifacts unrelated to the source code itself; package authors can `npm publish` artifacts containing the exact source code from their repos if they want though. If.

With Go, having a mirror of the source code is still third party infra, but is more an optimization than anything else, and checksums are generated based on the source itself[2] (rather than any unrelated artifact). This checksum should match even for people not using any proxy, so if you serve different code to someone, there will be a mismatch between the checksum of the downloaded module and the checksum from the SumDB. This should catch force-pushes done to a git repository version tag, for example.

Also, Go downloads the minimum version that satisfies packages, so it's less likely that you'll download a (semver) "patch" release that someone pushed hours ago.

All this makes me both like and dislike how Go handles dependencies.

[1]: Well, from a mirror, unless you set `GOPROXY=direct`. Reasoning explained in next paragraph.

[2]: The checksum is calculated from a zip file, but it is generated in a deterministic way, and this checksum is also generated and validated locally when you download dependencies. More info at https://go.dev/ref/mod#zip-files and https://go.dev/ref/mod#go-mod-verify