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Posted by mooreds 10 hours ago

GitHub Agentic Workflows(github.github.io)
185 points | 105 commentspage 2
kaicianflone 6 hours ago|
This is a solid step forward on execution safety for agentic workflows. Permissions, sandboxing, MCP allowlists, and output sanitization all matter. But the harder, still unsolved problem is decision validation, not execution constraints. Most real failures come from agents doing authorized but wrong things with high confidence. Hallucinations, shallow agreement, or optimizing for speed while staying inside the permission box.

I’m working on an open source project called consensus-tools that sits above systems like this and focuses on that gap. Agents do not just act, they stake on decisions. Multiple agents or agents plus humans evaluate actions independently, and bad decisions have real cost. This reduces guessing, slows risky actions, and forces higher confidence for security sensitive decisions. Execution answers what an agent can do. Consensus answers how sure we are that it should do it.

clarkdale 9 hours ago||
I feel like this solution hallucinated the concept of Workflow Lock File (.lock.yml), which is not available in Github Actions. This is a missing feature that would solve the security risk of changing git tag references when calling to actions like utility@v1
woodruffw 8 hours ago||
I think in this context they mean “lock” as in “these are the generated contents corresponding to your source markdown,” not as in “this is a lockfile.” But I think that’s a pretty confusing overlap for them to have introduced, given that a lack of strong dependency pinning is a significant ongoing pain point in GHA.
acedTrex 8 hours ago|||
You can already hardcode the sha of a given workflow in the ref, and arguably should do that anyways.
chippiewill 8 hours ago|||
It doesn't work for transitive dependencies, so you're reliant on third party composite actions doing their own SHA locking.
eddythompson80 8 hours ago|||
You can also configure a policy for it [0] and there are many oss tools for auto converting your workflow into a pinned hash ones. I guess OP is upset it’s not in gh CLI? Maybe a valid feature to have there even if it’s just a nicety

[0] https://github.blog/changelog/2025-08-15-github-actions-poli...

resquawk 2 hours ago||
[dead]
r2vcap 4 hours ago||
I tested it a bit yesterday, and it looks good—at least from a structural perspective. Separating the LLM invocation from the apply step is a great idea. This isn’t meant to replace our previous deterministic GitHub Actions workflow; rather, it enables automation with broader possibilities while keeping LLM usage safer.

Also, a reminder: if you run Codex/Claude Code/whatever directly inside a GitHub Action without strong guardrails , you risk leaking credentials or performing unsafe write actions.

resquawk 1 hour ago|
> Separating the LLM invocation from the apply step is a great idea

Thanks, yes, this is crucial.

qwertox 6 hours ago||
I want to see where we're at in 2 years, because these last couple of months have been pretty chaotic (but in a good sense) in terms of agents doing things with other agents. I think this is the real wake-up-call, that these dumb and error-prone agents can do self-correcting teamwork, which they will hopefully do for us.

Two years, then we'll know if and how this industry has completely been revolutionized.

By then we'd probably have an AGI emulator, emulated through agents.

dboreham 6 hours ago|
Spoiler: this is how humans always worked. Even Einstein had his wife, Marcel Grossmann and Hilbert, among others.
thulah 3 hours ago||
And Stalin had Lysenko.
julius-fx 7 hours ago||
I’d appreciate if they fix the log viewer in GH actions. That would have a larger impact, by far.
mickdarling 7 hours ago||
It looks like it does have an MCP Gateway https://github.com/github/gh-aw-mcpg so I may see how well it works with my MCP server. One of the components mine makes are agent elements with my own permissioning, security, memory, and skills. I put explicit programatic hard stops on my agents if they do something that is dangerous or destructive.

As for the domain, this is the same account that has been hosting Github projects for more than a decade. Pretty sure it is legit. Org ID is 9,919 from 2008.

mbrumlow 2 hours ago||
I think it is funny they all these companies are spending a ton and racing to have a AI story. It’s almost like none of the executives understand AI.

If you are changing your product for AI - you don’t understand AI. AI doesn’t need you to do this, and it doesn’t make you a AI company if you do.

AI companies like Anthropic, OpenAI, and maybe Google, simply will integrate at a more human leave and use the same tools humans used in the past, but do so at a higher speed, reliability.

All this effort wasted, as AI don’t need it, and your company is spending millions maybe billions to be an AI company that likely will be severely devalued as AI advances.

sidpatil 8 hours ago||
Does this products directly compete with GitHub Models [1]?

[1] https://github.com/marketplace?type=models

simonw 8 hours ago|
I think it makes use of GitHub models.
idan 5 hours ago||
Nope, it uses Copilot CLI under the hood (with your token)
resquawk 1 hour ago||
It uses Copilot, Claude Code or OpenAI Codex. Custom engines/coding agents also possible.
abracos 9 hours ago||
Link to github.com: https://github.github.com/gh-aw/
siva7 7 hours ago|
Somehow i want to ask what's the actual job of those former software engineers. Agents everywhere, on your local machine, in the pipeline, on the servers, and they are doing everything. Yes, the specs also.
samuelknight 7 hours ago||
Someone still has orchestrate the shit show. Like a captain at the helm in the middle of a storm.

Or you can be full accelerationist and give an agent the role of standing up all the agents. But then you need someone with the job of being angry when they get a $7000 cloud bill.

ivanjermakov 7 hours ago||
What is the job of a truck driver, if it's the truck that delivers goods?
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