> Will you release the full PoC?

> Yes — it's on this page. We held it for a month while distros prepared patches; the major builds are out as of this writing.

There is no update available for Ubuntu 24, PoC works and just tried updating.

I tried this on NixOS, but it doesn't seem to be easily reproducible. There's no /usr/bin/su - okay, fine: I changed it to /run/wrappers/bin/su, but that didn't work, and I think the reason why is because the NixOS suid wrappers have +x but not +r:

    $ ls -lah /run/wrappers/bin/su
    -r-s--x--x 1 root root 70K Apr 27 11:09 /run/wrappers/bin/su

Not that this makes the underlying mechanism of the exploit any better, but I wonder what else you can do with it. Is there a way to target a suid binary that doesn't have +r? I guess all of the suid binaries necessarily don't, since the wrapper system doesn't grant it and you can't have suid binaries in the /nix/store.

I know it's also unrelated, but this is the most aggressively obvious LLM slop copy I've ever seen and it is a page with like 30 sentences. I guess we're just seriously doing this, huh?

Despite the copy/images being weird about RHEL 14.3, this seems to work. Wow?

Use extreme caution running arbitrary code on your machines, especially obfuscated code that tickles kernel bugs! (edited)

SUID binaries once again assisted a local privilege escalation attack. This is a major problem that distros can't keep ignoring.

> If your kernel was built between 2017 and the patch

This is why I compile my own kernel. I disable things I don't use. If it's not present it can't hurt you.

> block AF_ALG socket creation via seccomp regardless of patch state.

Likewise I use seccomp to only allow syscalls that are necessary. Everything else is disabled. In the programs I have that need to connect to a backend socket, that is done, and then socket creation is disabled.

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