Posted by Timofeibu 10 hours ago
GitHub is investigating unauthorized access to their internal repositories - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48201316 - May 2026 (321 comments)
A fine grained token is likely to have read access to the IaaS repo as that is likely the very repo they are operating on when the malware compromises them.
3800 repos up for blackmail may make a good headline but it's likely that Github don't really care about 3798 of those repos being made public. It'd be annoying for those 3798 to be made public but they can deal with that. It's the 2 repos that contain really important stuff that they really don't want to be made public. You can't rely on fine grained tokens to limit the leak of these things as, at some point, someone with that very access will get compromised.
Limiting TTL on tokens/auth isn't a perfect solution either. If the token is leaked via some malware it can be used to clone repos within minutes (even seconds) of being leaked. No-one wants to have to perform 2FA every few seconds in order to get on with their day.
IP based restrictions may help, but then the malware would probably evolve to include a tailscale/wireguard key so that the clone/exfiltration is done from the existing IP address and then the data is proxied away separately.
Future dev environments are going to be heavily sandboxed in terms of "do github stuff in this sandbox, copy files to another sandbox to do package updates, vet everything coming back, etc"
agree generally with what your getting at though: doesn't solve this problem. but even just a basic reduction in blast radius would be nice.
I mean, I understand that it is hard to sandbox Node.js applications, but apparently Microsoft has put way more effort into their Copilot slop than security.
[0] https://github.com/microsoft/vscode/issues/52116
Your security or their money (selling Copilot to enterprise customers): what would they choose, hmm? Surprise!
Just don’t install crap maybe.
- Enable audit log streaming[1] on your enterprise including source IPs and API requests, even if it’s just going to an S3 bucket nobody looks at it, your incident response team will thank you later.
- Enforce the use of SSO on your GitHub organization[2], not just because SSO is good but because it forces an explicit authorization action[3] by users to grant an SSH key/PAT access to your organization resources, instead of granting access implicitly. That way the PAT created for someone’s weekend project won’t have access to your organization resources.
- Enforce an IP allowlist[4] for your organization from a set of known trusted VPN/corporate IPs. This is by-far the strongest control (and the most painful to rollout) as it will prevent stolen credentials (even if still valid) from being used by an attacker except on the intended systems where you (hopefully) have other visibility/alerting via EDR or related tooling.
- If you can, restrict access from personal access tokens[5] to your organization resources. Blocking classic PATs and enforcing a maximum expiration (ex: 3 months) on fine-grained PATs is a great way to reduce risk if you can’t eliminate PATs altogether[6].
- If you use GitHub enterprise (on-prem), configure collection of the raw HTTP access logs[7] in addition to native GitHub audit logs, it may prove critical during incident response.
[1]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/mon... [2]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/authentic... [3]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/authentic... [4]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/organizat... [5]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/organizat... [6]: https://edu.chainguard.dev/open-source/octo-sts/overview/ [7]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.16/admin/moni...
I'm not saying it was whatwedo.twig, but I'm not saying it wasn't, either.
Edit: If anyone's got a good recommendation for a twig formatter for Cursor / VS Code, please let me know.
They also have an online demo/playground so you can at least give it a shot to see if it works.
I’ve used the twiggy LSP before and there seems to be a few VS code extensions for it: https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=moetelo.... and https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=Stanisla...
I wonder if it was open-vsx specific?
https://github.com/nrwl/nx-console/security/advisories/GHSA-...
https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/nx-console-vs-code-extensio...
I'm also mirroring public ones to Codeberg.
I'll write about it when I'm done.