Concepts like this make me think about precision in products. When you spend 40,000$ on a computer chip you get a commodity piece of nm-scale precision. When you spend 40,000$ on a pink ivory coffee table you get a pile of wood with a maximum precision of 0.1-1mm. I'm just wondering what it would be like if atom-level precision was the main focus of every single premium product.

If a corporation does not have an incentive to make money, it will not align its priorities correctly.

For every neatly diversified company you have 10 zombie companies with workers floundering around like ants without a queen.

I'm not sure I'd say a company that makes ceramic toilets also making a tool for memory chips... which is also ceramic is really 'different things'. They're clearly a ceramic company. Different tolerances, but similar expertise.

Now the paper company got into the hotel business seems a far better example. No idea how that happens.

It's really odd to me that having an advanced ceramics division at Toto is considered such and odd diversified activity, and on top of that making money from the expertise of that division. Deep knowledge of ceramics would seem to me, to be a fundamental advantage if your main line of business is making ceramic toilets.

Companies like this with deep interlocking expertise used to be common in the US too when the US actually made things. GE was a conglomerate of "diversified" expertise - at least until a grandfather of financialization laid the seed to take apart the company.

AT&T and Xerox used to maintain all sorts of deep expertise in all sorts of science and technical activities - though maybe it could be noted that they were famously bad at spinning out other diversified product lines. But the expertise was a need in their core activities. Maybe the most interesting thing about Japanese businesses is that they have shown how to successfully start and maintain diversified product lines.

The main reason we are surprised by these "diversified" products, I suspect is that the typical American (and HN reader), is just not very familiar with the wide range of expertise needed to actually run manufacturing businesses.

Asian countries seem to have a different approach to diversification. In the East it is the companies that diversify while in the West it is the shareholders that diversify. So Bill Gates will not tell Microsoft to start farming, but he probably does have farms in his portfolio.

The Japanese economy is also famous for a macro economic stagnation for almost 40 years, a mild deflationary spiral, and companies hoarding cash on balance sheets rather than return it or invest it.

There are definitely world class companies in Japan, but also broad systemic problems with incentives

> In 2007, workers at a Toyota plant in Kentucky pulled the andon cord 2,000 times per week; workers at a Ford plant in Michigan pulled it just twice a week. You can’t get all the benefits of a single practice without installing the complete bundle.

This example seems to contradict the author's main point.

The Toyota factory in Kentucky got some of the benefits of the Japanese approach without importing every practice. They might have had a more Japanese organisation than Ford, but surely they didn't replace American practices in matters outside their control. They still had to deal with American approaches to labour practices, banking, local government, etc., all of which are called out in the article as necessary for the J-mode to flourish.

I almost feel like this topic deserves a further deep dive. This seems like a more profound difference of cultures: Japan, where failure is stigmatized and less of an option, optimizes for survival, and the United States, where failure is common, optimizes for growth(? wealth? fame?).

The pattern might also hold at a broader level. The United States is a relatively young nation that has seen plenty of internal strife (plenty of civil wars including The Civil War) whereas Japan has existed in some form for 2,600 years.

Probably too deep to consider, but the thought hit me that trees and plants (like these J-firms) grow multiple branches as quickly as they can because they are optimizing for survival.

Very well done. I lived in Japan for years, love Japan deeply, and this essay rang true in many ways.

Two thoughts:

- Japanese management style and processes are probably fruitful ground for understanding how teams of agents should work. H-firms require inspirational leadership, and agents don't need that.

- There is an interesting opportunity to turn Japanese process knowledge into a trainable environment, which of course should be done in such a way to benefit Japan and the Japanese people ("The type of deep process knowledge that has accreted within companies like Kyocera and Toto is almost impossible to replicate")

I might be gatekeeping, but I consider a mark of actual healthy capitalism, to be creative destruction, the biggest companies of 1 generation are destroyed by the next generation and the churn keeps going on. Nothing ever lasts except the system.

By this criteria, in the entire world, only US and UK seem to do capitalism properly. Whether the current age of tech companies survive till 2050s is to be seen, (we are already seeing signs of OpenAI, Anthropic joining them but it is to be said if the existing monopolies of say Microsoft will be disrupted).

In other countries, big companies have been the same for hundreds of years, from Japan to Germany to Korea to India. This is no longer capitalism as much as it is some soft form of Feudalism, where the same set of families hold power for generations at a time till some major fortune swings occur.