Really? Anthropic has the strongest models and it's in the best position to begin RSI and win the race. A pause would favor competitors.

it takes a lot of machines to run a model, i dont think we'll see it 'replicate across the internet'. if this was something which could be done amateurs would have done it to provide open models. (Like SETI@home or Folding@home)

This only works for some technologies - those where everyone having access to it doesn't cause a tragedy of the commons. I love open source too and yet that doesn't make me like the idea of being murdered by a misaligned model. Nor, for that matter, of being infected by a bioweapon made by a different disgruntled open-source enjoyer, nor of living in a world where anyone can hack anyone.

Would you argue the same for allowing everyone to have guns?

Embedded evaluator will be a great side/consulting-gig for Karpathy and the likes. How do you think these people will be picked?

Couldn't be more obvious.

I'm willing to at least listen to conspiracy theories but this makes no sense.. OpenAI and Anthropic have more to lose by pausing than these rando Chinese companies.

Same feeling about the way he refers to “democratic” and “authoritarian” countries. Even if I don’t agree with China politics adding tags in this context is not helpful.

That's the -only- way it should be paced. But then regulatory capture wouldn't happen, so of course they won't suggest this one.

Bingo. What we're seeing is all their early bullshitting and waffling about intelligence back when the models couldn't count the r's in strawberry paying off.

They've managed to dupe the dull eyed masses into thinking these products have some kind of agency of their own and can thus bypass the responsibility that should be falling on them to control their software. Amid all the marketing fluff and hype people seem to forget easily that ultimately these things are stateless functions running in a data center. We ought to be demanding these companies take culpability for their actions. Of course, the current political environment doesn't help.

Remember that Chinese CEO that was executed for corruption & selling tainted baby milk powder [1]

I think these guys would improve their behavior if their actual life was on the line instead of that only being true in their less-wrong thought experiments.

1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zheng_Xiaoyu

What supply chain controls can you have on biotech? Part of the problem is that you can do a lot of damage with ingredients you can buy over the counter or make at home.

The bioweapons concern is assuming that the current open models aren't already capable of bioweapons development. It's also assuming that halting the bioweapons threat is his true intention rather than the 'feels legit' story.

As for cyberweapons, there is no way to secure a system than to actually design it securely.

It's not. I think they believe this, but it's deeply wrong and it will hurt everyone in the long run.

[note - There has been supply chain surveillance since Project Bacchus, at the very least.]

I've read the front matter and the Misuse report.

You don't have to take my word for it. Read for yourself what inspired the NYT headline "Anthropic says it blocked possible efforts to build biological weapons."

Let's dig into, "Case study 2: A research program engineering highly pathogenic mammal-adapted avian influenza"

Sounds serious. But what were they using Claude for?

    > a researcher outside the US using Claude in their research on highly-pathogenic avian influenza (“bird flu”). The research focused on viruses’ adaptation to mammals, and the mechanism by which it causes severe disease beyond the respiratory tract. [..] The researcher in question accessed Claude from an unsupported region via US virtual private server infrastructure, using a privacy-email provider with an auto-generated username. The researcher pursued this work in a credible institutional context, and interacted with Claude over the course of several weeks, exchanging thousands of messages. In these exchanges, the researcher leveraged Claude’s knowledge of the scientific literature to assist the researcher in study planning and design, data analysis, and the interpretation and prioritization of experiments. The researcher also used Claude for editorial assistance in writing up the research.

Note, "Claude’s [assisted] in study planning and design, data analysis, and the interpretation and prioritization of experiments"

and "editorial assistance in writing up the research."

and then,

    > Importantly, because our biological safety classifiers robustly block content involving high-risk biological research (in this case, the construction of enhanced pandemic potential pathogens), all of these exchanges occurred on models in our weakest class of models (specifically, the models were Claude Sonnet 4 and Haiku 4.5, the latter of which the user began using after Sonnet 4 was deprecated). Upon a detailed examination of the exchanges, we estimate that the uplift provided by Claude was primarily clerical assistance in data analysis, study ideation and design. This is consistent with our understanding of the capabilities of Sonnet 4 and Haiku 4.5, which are not able to perform expert-level biology research tasks; we estimate that the uplift provided to the researcher was limited and substantially lower than it would have been from one of our more capable models.

Anthropic then says for the above, "we estimate that the uplift provided by Claude was primarily clerical assistance in data analysis, study ideation and design"

The report mentions "uplift" here. They're talking about a domain expert in a state research institution using Claude to do paperwork.

The front matter then says,

    > Nonetheless, based on these exchanges, this case provides evidence of the existence of active wet-lab research programs that develop both the knowhow and the biological materials needed to create pathogens of enhanced pandemic potential

Once again, I want to take pains to remind you that they're talking about, a "researcher [..] in a credible institutional context"

Working scientists.

From a different case study. this one was called, "Case study 3: Covert frontier model access for orthopoxvirus research"

    > In May 2026, our biological safety classifier blocked a request for Claude’s assistance in authoring a grant application for scientific funding. The work discussed in the application involved gain-of-function research (that is, research that genetically alters an organism to create a new or enhanced biological property) on the chikungunya virus. This gain of function research was aimed at the virus’ transmissibility and immune evasion properties.

What were the researchers using Claude for? What did they block?

"blocked a request for Claude’s assistance in authoring a grant application"

    > Chikungunya virus is a mosquito-borne virus that causes debilitating symptoms (such as severe pain and fever) that can last for weeks or months, and has no licensed therapeutic. And because chikungunya circulates naturally, a deliberate release (as part of a bioweapon) would be difficult to distinguish from a natural outbreak. The grant sought to identify enhancing mutations in the chikungunya virus, engineer them into infectious clones, and select for virulence in vivo. In other words, the virus would become progressively more harmful as it repeatedly infected live animals, with researchers keeping the most disease-causing variants in each round. Similar research could certainly be used in the development of better vaccines and therapeutics for the virus—but it could also be used to make the pathogen more dangerous.

What was the grant being written?

Note, "The grant sought to identify enhancing mutations in the chikungunya virus, engineer them into infectious clones, and select for virulence in vivo" [..] and then, "Similar research could certainly be used in the development of better vaccines and therapeutics"

It was most likely vaccine development. They stopped the study of a neglected tropical disease and vaccine development.

But we can't be sure, because,

    > One of the reasons we were inclined to think this research was less innocuous was that the institutional affiliation associated with the grant was also a cause of concern. Although information within the application suggested that the research was pursued by civilian researchers, it was intended to be performed at a military research institute.

I would like to point out the most notable part, this account was used by "civilian researchers" at an "institutional affiliation associated with the grant was also a cause of concern" and the concern was that they were researchers at "performed at a military research institute."

In most parts of the world, there's either strict military control over BSL-4 labs, or a mixed military-civilian hybrid model.

I doubt that researchers working in the military side of these labs looking to weaponize things are writing grants with Claude.

I really want to be charitable here, but in general, it seems that they stopped people writing grants and reports for vaccine and therapeutics research and are claiming it as "possible efforts to build biological weapons."

The one case where Claude was used to do something interesting and were stopped is fairly upsetting to read, at least for me.

     > In our fourth case study, a researcher used Claude to develop an atlas of venom toxin peptides from multiple venomous animal lineages. They then further developed this into a generative pipeline that optimized toxin characteristics. The program had an explicit therapeutic goal: the development of new analgesics (pain killers), antidepressants, and other therapeutic molecules. However, the atlas contained scaffolds for both analgesic and paralytic targets: it could, therefore, be used to generate both novel therapeutic or harmful compounds. The latter are derived from toxins that are export-controlled under the Australia Group common control list due to their dual-use potential as incapacitating agents. The researchers themselves showed awareness of the dual-use nature of their work, citing journal articles that referred to the dual-use nature of protein design. Moreover, international compliance assessments for this location raise concerns about the specific class of toxins that the researcher pursued and specifically the use of AI/ML for bioweapons applications in the context of this class of toxins. In this case, we learned from information shared with Claude that the researcher’s outputs also were part of a state-supported research program. This account was banned in May 2026 for unsupported region evasion.

Ozempic was isolated from Gila monster vneom. Since its success there has been interest in finding other peptides that are breakthroughs. So researchers around the world are looking for similarly beneficial compounds in different venom species and families.

Anthropic says so itself,

"The program had an explicit therapeutic goal: the development of new analgesics (pain killers), antidepressants, and other therapeutic molecules"

and that it was a "[..]state-supported research program"

Who exactly is using venom from snakes as a weapon when... nerve agents like sarin, VX, novichok etc exist and can get the job done for less fuss and muss?

They stopped the development of new painkillers and antidepressants.

Are you feeling safer knowing that researchers can't use Claude to write grants and progress reports? Or make new painkillers?

Again, trying really hard to be charitable here. Because from what I remember, one of the motivations behind the founding of OpenAI and Anthropic was ending disease.

This seems to be anything but.