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Posted by Ryan5453 7 hours ago

Keys Not Included: recovering the signing keys for US driver's license barcodes(ryan.science)
164 points | 59 commentspage 2
simoncion 6 hours ago|
At the time of this writing, the subtitle of the submission here on HN is

  recovering the signing keys for US driver's license barcodes
Notably, this subtitle doesn't appear on the blog post.

Anyway. I only see claims that the public key can be determined from license barcodes, not that a signing key can be determined. What am I missing or misunderstanding?

To head off one potential retort: While it's true that one can use a public key to encrypt data for the recipient that has the private half of that key or verify that data has been signed by the possessor of the private half of that key, I'm almost 100% certain that it's not possible to use that public key to sign data would validate to other folks as being signed by the private half of that key. It has been more than a decade since I've thought about any of this, but isn't the entire point of public-key cryptography that the public part can be distributed to your worst enemy without causing you any trouble at all?

trollbridge 6 hours ago||
Yes. The subtitle is wrong. He recovers the public key, due to the way EDCSA signing works.
kccqzy 6 hours ago||
Yup. The person who submitted this to HN is probably way less knowledgeable on this topic than the writer of the article. The article clearly labels the recovered keys as “recovered public keys” at the top.
otterley 6 hours ago||
Given the poster's nickname, the person who posted it and the author may be one and the same.
kccqzy 6 hours ago||
I think the author is Claude.
antonvs 3 hours ago||
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piratejon 6 hours ago||
That's really neat! Seems potentially adaptable to paper currency--a verifiable QR code digital signature of the bill's serial number creates a cryptographically hard obstacle to counterfeiting!
kqp 6 hours ago||
Copy known good serial number + signature.
teravor 5 hours ago||
combine with a central authority server network and make it blind signatures and you have untraceable e-cash.
lxgr 3 hours ago|||
Blind signatures don’t work like that. Once you unblind them, they are very traceable. Chaumian e-cash can only be spent once for that reason.
mitxela 3 hours ago|||
No government wants untraceable e-cash. They want it fully traceable.
lxgr 3 hours ago||
It’s a bunch of static signed data, which is hard to modify but trivial to copy. Not exactly what you’d want for bank notes.

NFC and a challenge-response protocol could work, though, like e.g. the one used in biometric passports.

EPWN3D 6 hours ago||
> Before signing, the encoder fills the field with a placeholder (0), repeated for the field's exact length - signs the entire payload including that placeholder, and then writes the real signature over the top of it. To verify, you put the placeholder back.

I hate shit like this. Do not let your crypto layer know about the structure of what it's signing. Keep security stupid.

woodruffw 5 hours ago||
As far as compact encodings go, this kind of patch-and-fill technique isn't particularly egregious. The alternative mentioned (where the verifier has to be aware of a bitfield that defines the to-be-signed elements) is much easier to mess up!
lazide 6 hours ago||
Counterpoint - every real world crypto algo needs to do somewhat content aware padding or the crypto is much easier to break. Either that, or go so overboard on randomness that it adds a lot of overhead.

When you look at the details underneath more crypto, there is a lot of ah hah - and ‘doh’ - moments due to implementation realities.

davemultifactor 4 hours ago||
this is cool
samlinnfer 6 hours ago|
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