Posted by m-hodges 4 days ago
Computing has historically been a field of wizardry. It's... interesting (?) to see so many people pushing so hard in the direction of sorcery, and in fact applying that sorcery to other fields, in which they themselves aren't quite able to validate whether the spell worked or not.
The usual format that fun mathematics is presented (being talked at by someone who is very well versed in the subject) comes with a heavy cognitive burden - and often I just can't really make it through.
When the author is not an expert the writing is just so much more accessible - it's easier to understand and making it through feels more of an adventure and less of a lecture.
I've never thought previously how much I would enjoy this format though. I'm here to see more amateurs stumbling through mathematics.
Also, wasn't expecting this sort of side-quest from the guy who got me into React.
I love this approachable prose.
If anyone is aware of any other "mathematics for people who don't know mathematics" resources I'd greatly appreciate any links.
Edit I apologize to Dan Abramov for venting my frustrations about things outside of either of our control and unfairly using him as a punching bag. He seems to be an intelligent person and I hope he continues learning mathematics using whatever tools he sees fit, including AI. It was wrong of me to do this and I will take a break from this website for one week.
Knowledge is of 2 kinds: know-that and know-how. Know-that is what LLMs are enabling such as the proof here, while know-how is more useful as that constitutes understanding and puts that knowledge to use.
Primarily I thought of this as a sort of "epistemic performance art project", maybe similar to playing Elden Ring blindfolded having never played it before, or speedrunning a game by opening a box a thousand times and overflowing some counter. It's funny and absurd to do knowledge work without the knowledge.
I think it's also a stress test of meta skills. Like, how much can we do without knowing? What kind of processes can we set up around these demons that would constrain them into our requirements? How can we know when things are going wrong? In some sense, this isn't too different from engineering management.
Naturally, I'm also interested in how much of my role in this could've been automated away. Can there be a skill for that? Then "do a breakthrough" is an irrelevant implementation detail of that skill.
Note that "do a breakthrough" actually produced the worst results over the runs. The best results were from more directed runs like searching for first obstacle towards the next milestone.
The wizards don’t become sourcerers themselves - they become enthusiastic users of someone else’s sourcery. Their years of learning don’t protect them from mistaking access to power for mastery of it.
Counter argument, "historically" is not last year but closer to 2 decades ago.
modern computing has sat atop a mountain of sorcery for ages. You may be able to squint and call a good compiler a "tool of power" more than sorcery but there are plenty of other tech stacks that simply sit upon one opaque box after another.
And it's not unusual for sorcery to produce crap, even if it's production worth crap. Dreamweaver had a WYSIWYG editor ages ago and as someone who was hand crafting HTML in that era it's code was typically a mess.
Now that's the norm, almost nobody makes HTML by hand, some js framework does. And it's often shit, I've seen entire sources of nothing but <div> nested ad-nauseam, conjured up from the depths of "I-don't-care-as-long-as-it-works"
Sorcerers are the vibe coders of D&D magic, which perfectly describes how wizards in-universe feel about them.
The net output of math will increase, and mathematicians have more work now to unravel all this, and make it useful. AI plays the role of a monkey in the infinite monkey theorem [1]. We now need an LLM corollary - Something like: A finite number of LLM agents will almost surely find all theorems given an infinite token budget.
For any finite program (eg some LLMs), there is a true math theorem which they cannot prove or disprove (given fixed input of the statement with no other information sources). If that weren’t true, BB would be computable.
Math is beyond computation. Since AI is just bits in bits out, it has this fundamental limitation.
Any magic of AI systems comes from the transformed meaning of its input data. With fixed weights any LLM is just an artifact. For example a human prompting an LLM constitutes an extra information source, which removes the above limitations. In theory any input from the natural world would remove the limitations too. The natural world is a black box and we don't know what kind of meaning or intelligence could underly it.
We are talking about the same thing, but I would actually put this the other way around.
Computation and computability is "the final frontier". Math is a "subset" of that. Doesn't matter if we choose ZFC or in the future discover some "better" subset of core axioms, we will always hit limits where BB will trivially skip over whatever we could prove (let alone Gödel's theorems).
> given fixed input of the statement with no other information sources
Also, this is just trivially avoidable, so not sure if we really should be concerned about this limitation. An LLM in a loop where it can write on a tape can be Turing complete, ergo it can compute anything computable and is "bigger" than math at that point.
In what sense? BB(n) is a prime example of an object that can be mathematically defined, yet is not computable. Or see BBB(n) for an "even more" uncomputable function. [0]
> An LLM in a loop where it can write on a tape can be Turing complete
What does this mean? A given LLM, like a given C program, can't really be Turing complete or not in a meaningful sense. The C programming language, or the concept of LLMs in general can be said to be Turning complete or not. Do you mean to state that LLMs in general are not Turing complete, but being "in a loop" somehow makes a difference?
> it can compute anything computable and is "bigger" than math at that point
Again, in what sense is it "bigger" than math? Lots of things are Turing complete, I wouldn't classify lambda calculus as "bigger" than math.
Maybe I'm misunderstanding you point, but I don't know how widely this would be held as true. Are you defining "math" as _only_ what can be proven under some particular formal system?
For math I don't have a fix definition, but it's surely a bit more specific than that (e.g. I wouldn't consider the computation that prints a 0 at the same place for infinity math) - but of course I do see the circularity in my argument: a Turing machine is a mathematical object in and of itself. Though being able to talk about something doesn't necessarily change which is "bigger".
As for the other direction, this gets a bit more into the philosophy behind math itself. Constructive math's territory is "easy" - but I am on the opinion that if humans (or any intelligent physical entity) are at most Turing-complete [1], then any non-constructive math "steps" or thoughts must also be at most computable. Well, unfortunately I can't prove whether math done by transcendent entities are also computable, though.
In any case, I am no mathematician, so whatever I think regarding this topic may not have much relevance to anyone, only done CS course with quite a bit of math, but that's obviously not the same.
[1] I believe religion is an escape hatch here from an argument perspective
This is a bit of a strange assumption to make. I do agree that a human, if it had infinite memory, would be an universal machine, i.e. capable of computing any given Turing machine [0]. But would that be the limits of its capabilities? It's far from certain.
You'll get into the philosophy of free will (funnily enough, a sort of inverted Turing test), i.e. for a given human with infinite memory, is there a Turing machine that exactly replicates the behavior of that human? Is our behavior governed entirely by rules? Would that imply that a human themselves is a kind of Chinese room [1]?
> any non-constructive math "steps" or thoughts must also be at most computable.
What does it mean for a "thought" to be computable? Compare to Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Clearly the act of stating the thought, or writing down the theorem, is computable. But proving it to be true or false may very well be impossible.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Turing_machine [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room
Well, given our scientific knowledge it's a molecule-level (only important to disregard quantum physics to make the case easier) physical/chemical process, that we should in principle be able to simulate on any other medium, including a Turing machine.
Nonetheless, I can accept the definition of math where it's about "truths" and truths can obviously exist without being computable.
Do you agree that humans are physical systems?
My understanding is that any physical system can be evaluated to any degree of accuracy by a computer, no?
That's an interesting hypothesis, but I don't know why you'd assume it to be true at face value. It's a bit unclear how you would even define "evaluated", given that we don't yet have a mathematical model of all of physics as we know it. [0] And then consider unknown unknowns.
> Do you agree that humans are physical systems?
Do you consider humans _with infinite memory_ as physical systems? Do you consider computers _with infinite memory_ as physical systems?
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physics_beyond_the_Standard_Mo...
As for the infinite memory, Turing machines have this nice property that they can only visit a finite amount of memory after finite steps, no matter what. A Turing machine running for a finite time (we got this) will surely use a finite space, so being "a bit short" on infinite space is not a problem, I believe.
Yes... but that's in the area of the big bang and black holes. My understanding is that the chemistry of the brain is very well modeled.
So, unless we find unknown physics, and unless that physics behaves differently than every other known physics, humans are computable?
Do I have that right?
Now consider throwing a ball in the air. Can you even write down the rules that each of the ball's subatomic particles obeys? How can you be certain there exists a computer program that in finite time can predict where any of the particles, for any ball, ends up?
> the chemistry of the brain is very well modeled
There are models, but the fact of those models is that they do not apply to "any degree of accuracy", as you claim.
Consider the ball thrown in the air again. Is the ball affected by what happened 100 years ago, inside of a black hole 100 light years away? Why would it not be affected by that? Or if you grant that it is affected by that, do we then need a model to predict those effects before we can "evaluate" them?
EDIT regarding the below linked blog post: Did you read the rest of my comment? Did you even read the blog post you linked to?
> We certainly don’t have anything close to a complete understanding of how the basic laws actually play out in the real world — we don’t understand high-temperature superconductivity, or for that matter human consciousness
Can you try to consider my central point before replying: Are the rules governing physical reality simpler or more complex than the Collatz conjecture? Does there exist a (theoretical) computer that can "evaluate the Collatz conjecture to any degree of accuracy"?
EDIT 2: I'm not the one moving goalposts. On what grounds are you classifying the question whether a given number ends at 1 or not for the Collaz conjecture as an "inifite" computation? It's a simple boolean question, yes or no. All you have to do is build a computer that can answer yes or no for each integer. Isn't that simpler than answering the position of each atom in the ball after the throw? Each is just a function, what makes one more infinite than the other?
Also, regarding determinism, just read this article by the same guy you linked: https://preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/12/05/on-determin...
> For everyday-life purposes, we can’t get around the fact that quantum mechanics makes it impossible to predict the future robustly.
Are you sure?
https://preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2010/09/23/the-laws-un...
You've moved the goalposts again. I said simulate, not predict. It is possible to simulate the entire Schrödinger wavefunction.
And PLEASE - just use the reply button. It is impossible to track every time you edit your comment.
> ANY physical system can be evaluated to ANY DEGREE of accuracy by a computer
It's completely SENSELESS to claim that they are distinct, because in order to EVALUATE or SIMULATE the physical system you will need a FUNCTION which COMPUTES the STATE of the system at a given point in time. The only POSSIBLE distinction between SIMULATING and PREDICTING would be the time taken for the computation, but that is COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT as long as it is finite.
Again, your own source says:
> We CERTAINLY don’t have ANYTHING CLOSE to a complete UNDERSTANDING of how the basic laws actually play out in the real world
How does that square with your claim above?
You are entirely correct. I was sloppy in my first comment. I should have said simulate. My sincere apologies if that's been the crux of our dispute.
> The only POSSIBLE distinction between SIMULATING and PREDICTING would be the time taken for the computation
No. The distinction is in determining which "you" is you. When simulating the wavefunction, every you is simulated.
> We CERTAINLY don’t have ANYTHING CLOSE to a complete UNDERSTANDING of how the basic laws actually play out in the real world
It's very understandable if you include his following sentence:
> But these are manifestations of the underlying laws, not signs that our understanding of the laws are incomplete
He's saying we don't understand emergent behavior produced by the laws - not that the laws themselves are incomplete. E.g. we don't know how/why a bag of neurons turns into a person.
And - you should reply to my comments rather than edit your old ones.
IIUC, Godel's incompleteness is less about theorems and more about axiomatic systems. Given an axiomatic system, there are statements within it which cannot be proven or disproven. It's relatively unrelated to the platonic ideal of the theorem itself. The statements it considers are axiomatic-system-specific.
Another way to view it is, who cares if we can't prove or disprove "This statement is false". Ok, the axiomatic system is incomplete; fine. What's important is can the system prove a real theorem that I care about.
The busy beaver computability argument addresses these issues. The problem format is always "For Turing machine T with no input, does T halt?". This format can encode many math problems. And we know already that BB(432) is independent of ZF, aka, there is a 432-state TMs which ZF can't prove or disprove the halting behaviour of.
So BB looks at real theorems, ranks them, and we can ask what axiomatic systems can solve them or not. Godel looks at 1 axiomatic system and produces a toy theorem which the system can't solve. That's an extremely important difference!
The core issue is that any fixed LLM can only encode so many axiomatic systems in its states, and the fixed systems implies an upper bound in terms of the BB number which it can solve. Godel is only looking at one system at a time, while BB is a way to use a common problem format to rank every axiomatic system on an infinite number line.
I'm no mathematician, but this is also the crux of Gödel's theorem, he just showed it in a more "hacky" and clever way - but BB(432)'s relation to ZF is also a consequence of Gödel's more general idea, is it not?
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Oh, and: All proofs are conditional on axioms. If those axioms are computably enumerable, then all of their consequences are computably enumerable too.
Most propositions may be ugly and irrelevant, but how do you know how many are not so and we just can't prove it? Also, what about stuff like Continuum Hypothesis, would you add it or not?
LLMs use RNG for sampling, so they are not pure computers.
"Given infinite thinking time a finite number of humans will solve all theorems"
I also love the angle that this was not intelligence just brute force. As if the mathematicians didn't reeaaally want to solve this they were just too lazy to give it a good try.
What does AI have to actually do before you realize these things are actually smart?
Today it cost massive effort but it's possible 10-20yrs from now an AI could solve a problem like this in under an hour with a single thread on a free subscription paid for by serving an ad.
These arguments are so weak because you'll then have to make the same one a few years from now when it does something else impossible. The argument only stands if we assume no progress will occur.
I just think you and the other guy have different definitions of "smart". There's no denying that LLMs are useful, but I don't know if I'd classify them as "smart". There were probably people in the 80s saying computers were "smart" because they could compute 78971 * 12341 faster than a human.
In what sense is a LLM "undeniably smart" but a CPU from the 80s isn't? Or would you define such a CPU as "smart"?
You're right though they largely are "smart" in the 80's computer sense. This is largely due to continual learning being unsolved.
BUT the more you look at them, research, and try experiments there's something there not in a 80s computer. If I had to guess maybe 1-5% of a humans ability but it's there. They are able to do novel things but ever step outside of their distribution takes exponential effort for every small addition. There is a true ability to adapt and learn new things on the fly, things never seen before. That is the the smart part. There something hidden in these things we don't understand that allows novel insights built from in context learning.
It's actually measurable in experimental settings but even there it's hard to tease out. I saw it mostly while doing CL training experiments. But I also see it while working with them for coding novel things.
But the more power we provide and farther down the road of this we go those 1-5% are things like solving unsolved math problems. No human solved these things. You say brute force, I say it needed massive effort to break out of it's distribution and get those small insights. It's very human like when taken at scale. The scary thing is that scale is getting smaller every day.
And our brains must something like that at some physical level. You can't have a "turtles all the way down" of reasoning - the building blocks must be simpler. It must reduce to something like pathfinding and brute force at some point, weighted by factors in the system and maybe some randomness.
For undecidable theories, there is no computable function bounding this blowup from theorem length to proof length (otherwise, the theory would be decidable.)
This is a cool blog post and I think you're going the right way, and beginning to get an understanding of the proof as you go.
I'd recommend continuing on the simplification and understanding route, until you yourself can follow the proof. Some suggestions, as I did something similar:
1. See if (or ask the AIs) if individual parts of the proof can be found elsewhere, i.e., is an argument just a copy of something else? If so, it's important to attribute this, but also this usually allows simplification ("by Theorem X", etc.)
2. Look for redundant patterns and try to combine them.
3. Ask the AI to be a critical reviewer from some journal, and try to fix its criticisms.
4. Continue simplifying! Assume that the final result may actually be relatively short.
Good luck!
As with most interesting proofs, the number of core ideas is actually small, I'd say two for the real exponents, and presumably a third idea for lifting up to omnific integers. I have been redoing the real exponents part of the proof going on the ideas only, and with a few smarter choices, I am converging on something very short. And I mean very short, which is amazing. I didn't think the answer would be this close: it 'just' needs looking at the problem from the right angle, and also make a fairly bold guess at the outcome.
Dan's current proof is of course much longer. Between the fossilized ideas that Dan mentions in the post and the formalisation of previous results, there's a lot of cruft that inflates the proof but does not really help understanding what is going on. Luckily the word 'derivation' pops up early, otherwise it would have been very challenging to wade through the lemmas to find the important points.
The problem is rather how quickly we can change our ways of working to make sure the training and hiring pipeline does not collapse. That's the disastrous scenario, for both the individuals affected and the discipline, that we must avert somehow. I wish we had an easy answer to that. I certainly don't. But I like to think that at least engaging with the public in a constructive way will have a net positive effect.
But the effect is the same across other professions. We need mathematicians, we need professional grounding but we only "need" experts.
Every step AI takes feels like it slices people off the bottom of a profession, making them less relevant, while simultaneously increasing demand for the top.
the vicious cycle I see is it will "Eat the middle", you need people with juuust enough acumen in a subject to drive the AI, to set a goal and nudge to a direction, and you need a real expert to look at the results with a critical eye but you don't need the middle of the curve. I think over time this will depress hiring and wages of new people, and stunt their progress towards expertise by destroying the middle ground. Then when our current experts retire we'll be left in a lurch.
My hope is also that Mantova and very possibly L'Innocente will get a substantial share of credit for their role in the resolution of this conjecture by Conway: the AI would not have embarked on this were it not for their prior work. So even human mathematicians with an inclination for more exploratory "problem solving" will have plenty to do in the future. (The story is actually not that different for the recent Navier-Stokes forced blowup result, which also built on key conceptual work from 2023 by Córdoba and Martinez-Zoroa.)
You have nothing more to make of my comment because you don’t care to consider the actual problem here.
The math career is going to killed off 2-3 years before law and medicine and Wall Street banker. How does this make me more secure in any way?
This is indeed also coming for law, medicine, and banking, though licensed professions will hold out for longer because you need someone to put in jail when things go wrong. The problem is that all this is extremely over politicized and nobody is able to think clearly. They want to simultaneously say all this is just hype and a bubble and will go away like NFTs did, and also are starting to worry about economic replacement. Some more coherent political narrative will have to be formed.
Regarding being jobless for the 3 intervening years, it is certainly a personal concern but in this temporary phase there are still some other jobs for smart people. Once there aren't any, we are entering the part that I was talking about where you will be far from alone and you can join together to exert some kind of political pressure but it will not be about math PhDs, but employment as a whole. And it may not be very effective if AI is on the other side, not on yours. Yeah, it sounds like scifi, and people want to dismiss scifi concerns and instead focus just one inch ahead of their toes, instead of seeing the writing on the wall.
> people spending their lives trying to promote humanity
What does this even mean? Become a monk? They are credited with helping humanity.
Ahaha. Flowers are the way to go.
You still prefer to get cheaper options yourself. I know this argument gets caricatured in the "yet you participate in society" meme, but the point is that this is the aggregate result of individual humans making decisions on where to allocate their resources. You can attack this using various ideological and religious frameworks, but if it's just some stoner college freshman's communism, I'm not interested (neither if it's the more potent version that dispossessed my ancestors in Eastern Europe).
Air your LLM greviences someplace else.
And of course, going by their own admission, they couldn't "have done this themselves": the most you can argue wrt. this is that Mantova and L'Innocente, or some other narrow domain experts, might have done this themselves and that AI "scooped" this result from them.
Yes, I was not doing any mathematical work in curating the output, but the article makes it quite clear that pivots and constraints the LLM would not impose on itself were critical to actually making progress.
Also:
>He doesn’t even know any mathematics and has never cared to learn
While I don't know enough mathematics to work on this problem, claiming something like this is preposterous. As I link in the first paragraph of the article, I've been learning mathematics on my own by going through Terence Tao's Analysis book and solving exercises. I'm familiar with the concepts of mathematical definitions, proofs, etc. I've gotten about halfway through the book solving them on paper before abandoning it (and later got through the first few chapters in Lean, also solving every exercise — by hand, mind you). Sure, this doesn't make me a mathematician, but I'm closer to a dropout first-year student than to someone who has "never cared to learn".
Edit I apologize to Dan Abramov for venting my frustrations about things outside of either of our control and unfairly using him as a punching bag. He seems to be an intelligent person and I hope he continues learning mathematics using whatever tools he sees fit, including AI. It was wrong of me to do this and I will take a break from this website for one week. I won’t hide this comment though it is shameful.
Edit I apologize to Dan Abramov for venting my frustrations about things outside of either of our control and unfairly using him as a punching bag. He seems to be an intelligent person and I hope he continues learning mathematics using whatever tools he sees fit, including AI. It was wrong of me to do this and I will take a break from this website for one week.
It might be possible to plainly continue-shot it with more powerful models in the future. I agree that whatever I did is probably automatable.
Edit I apologize to Dan Abramov for venting my frustrations about things outside of either of our control and unfairly using him as a punching bag. He seems to be an intelligent person and I hope he continues learning mathematics using whatever tools he sees fit, including AI. It was wrong of me to do this and I will take a break from this website for one week.
I am not saying that my work constitutes a mathematical contribution on its own. Not any more than stumbling upon an anonymous manuscript with the solution would constitute a mathematical contribution. I do, however, think that it can lead to a mathematical contribution if any mathematicians consider it worthwhile to do something with it. Whether or not they consider it worthwhile is not up to me.
It is a distinction without a difference because I want to live in a world where people get to fill their lives with meaningful things, and are not forced into Uber delivery driving jobs just because rich people like you think it’s fun to put their name next to something other people made prestigious.
Edit I apologize to Dan Abramov for venting my frustrations about things outside of either of our control and unfairly using him as a punching bag. He seems to be an intelligent person and I hope he continues learning mathematics using whatever tools he sees fit, including AI. It was wrong of me to do this and I will take a break from this website for one week.
Re: "rich", I've essentially spent $400 on this (in subsidized subscriptions), plus my free time being a mindless drone. Given that you assume my role is automatable, it sounds like this is relatively accessible to anyone with $400 (as long as AI companies continue subsidizing the frontier models). I don't think I've had some kind of an unfair advantage beyond that. If anything, a proper mathematician would probably be able to derive the result much faster with the same tools.
I don't know how the broad availability of these tools (to mathematicians and non-mathematicians alike) will change the field, what is considered prestigious, what work gets funding, how it affects the pipeline, etc. You seem to be implying that even testing the limits of these tools, or at least publishing the results obtained with them, is unethical in itself, even though it is broadly accessible now. I can understand this point of view.
[0]https://www.google.com/search?q=video+introduction+to+surrea...
> However, I didn’t just want any result; I wanted something that pulls me.
> Initially, I asked Claude:
> Me: which unsolved problems in the Surreal Numbers research program pull you the most and why?
Note the switch from "pulls me" to "pull[s] you". What is the author's perception of the relationship/boundary between them and the LLM here?
1. Are they using it to find things it flags as interesting in hopes they might also find it interesting?
2. Do they consider "interesting" to be a universal (observer-independent) trait and are using the LLM to find things that are interesting?
3. Have they delegated their desire to find something interesting to the LLM so that it can instead find something that it flags as interesting, regardless of how the author feels?
4. Do they see it as a part of their thought process, and so do not distinguish "you" from "me"?
5. Do they see it as part of them, and are referring to the combined entity in the second person?
I would love clarification on this.
Let me first clarify my relationship with mathematics. I think of myself as "an awestruck observer from a distance". I find some parts that I understand beautiful, and I have also tried to understand some of the basics rigorously. However, I generally just can't make my way through any serious paper, as I both lack the prerequisites and struggle with the amount of inference mathematics tends to place on the reader. That's the "from a distance" part.
Now, about picking the problem. I am genuinely "pulled by" surreal numbers themselves. I find them irresistibly beautiful. There is also a bit of bitterness around how they haven't fulfilled their promise (yet?) as Conway hoped they would be able to become a better foundation for some mathematics. But they are a bit too difficult to prove things about so far, and we know too little about them. So what "pulls me" also is a possibility of making enough dents in this that we would be able to use them more broadly, and learn even more things about them.
However, I do not know the details of the latest research. I don't know which problems have actually been solved, which pursue Conway's original vision vs narrower approaches, and which are elegant enough to feel "awestruck" enough about. So this is an invitation from me to LLM to share what it "feels pulled by" (for whatever definition; I think of it as just navigating the languagespace) , and then sifting through that list to see if something it lists makes me feel something. I would assume that with the field currently being so small (serious mathematicians mostly don't care about surreals), it's easy to get the LLM "excited" (again, just a vector in the languagespace) enough that it would give me genuinely interesting candidates. Then it's up to me to sift through them and see if they "speak" to me.
It's like asking a mathrock nerd to share their favorite mathrock albums. Niche enough that you'd likely get good results. Then you can listen and form an opinion.
In this particular example, the "ONAG birthday" and "maybe last Conway's unsolved conjecture about surreals" part spoke to me emotionally, the statement itself amazed me with its simplicity, and I felt "blood in the water" related to the recent results bringing the conjecture closer. So I felt the pull myself and went with it.
Record scratch
I think this project is really neat, but is it appropriate to cold email specialists before you've put in enough hours of effort to describe yourself as more than an "amateur"? OP's emails may have been helpful, but billions of people use these LLMs to wade into new areas and email is already low signal-to-noise.
Upshot, if there are real errors in published work, I think most mathematicians want to know about them.
It doesn't matter who found the error nor how it was found. An error is an error.
Now here there was no fraud just genuine error, but it will annoy people nonetheless and scrape their ego that someone uninitiated can just type some stuff in a magic box and conclude that they, the established published, tenured mathematician with awards and medals can be wrong.
Got lost here. I think I'm officially too dumb for math.
You can think of the "surreal numbers" as being built up step by step. We start out with no numbers at all, and then we repeatedly do a construction that makes some new numbers.
A surreal number is made from two sets of (pre-existing) surreal numbers. We typically call them L and R, for "left" and "right", and sometimes write it as L|R or {L|R} or something like that. The "left" numbers have to be smaller than the "right" numbers. The resulting number will turn out to be, in a certain sense, the "simplest" number in between all the left numbers and all the right numbers.
Now, as I said, we start out with no numbers at all. It might seem like that gives us no way to proceed, but it does: even given no numbers at all, we can still make a set of numbers, namely the empty set! So we can use that for both L and R, getting ∅|∅. Empty sets on both sides. We call this 0, and it will turn out to behave in the way you'd expect the number 0 to behave.
Now we suddenly have another set available, namely {0}, the set containing only zero. Which means that instead of being able to make one number, maybe we can make four: ∅|∅, ∅|{0}, {0}|∅, {0}|{0}. The first of these we already knew about. The last isn't actually admissible -- remember that the "left" numbers have to be smaller than the "right" numbers, which is "vacuously" true when one of those sets is empty (it means "if you have a number x in the left set, and a number y in the right set, then x<y", and if there are no numbers in the left set or no numbers in the right set then that's trivially true) but isn't true when both sets contain 0 because 0<0 is false.
So actually we get two new numbers: ∅|{0} and {0}|∅. The first fits into what OP calls the gap "between nothing and zero". The second first into what OP calls "the gap between zero and nothing". In both cases, "zero" means a number and "nothing" means a space where we don't yet have any numbers.
The number ∅|{0} is called -1 (it has to lie to the left of 0, and there's no constraint on its left, and -1 is "the simplest number less than 0") and the number {0}|∅ is called +1 (it has to lie to the right of 0, and there's no constraint on its right, and +1 is "the simplest number greater than 0").
I should explicitly acknowledge that I haven't defined what "less than" and "greater than" actually mean for these numbers, nor anything else about how they relate to one another that could possibly justify giving these things the specific names 0, -1, and +1. But there are definitions for "less than" and "greater than" and "plus" and "minus" and so forth, and the whole thing does turn out to work very nicely.
Anyway, once we've got these numbers we have eight possible sets that can go on the left or on the right. The requirement for left-things to be smaller than right-things reduces the possibilities somewhat, and the actual new numbers we get next time around are: ∅|{-1}, which turns out to be -2; {-1}|{0} which turns out to be -1/2; {0}|{+1} which turns out to be +1/2; {+1}|∅ which turns out to be +2. We also get some already-existing numbers in new ways; for instance, {-1}|{+1} is actually equal to 0 ("0 is the simplest number between -1 and +1"). Again, I should explicitly acknowlege that I haven't said anything about how you determine when two of these things are actually equal; again, it does all turn out to work properly.
If you keep going with this construction, you produce all the integers, two at a time, and also all the "dyadic rationals", meaning fractions where the denominator is a power of 2. And then, once you've got all those, at the next stage of construction you abruptly get all the real numbers -- e.g., the square root of 2 is L|R where L = {dyadic rational numbers that are negative or have a square smaller than 2} and R = {dyadic rational numbers that are positive and have a square larger than 2} -- and you also get {0,1,2,3,4,...}|∅, conventionally written as a lower-case Greek letter omega, which is an infinite number, larger than all the integers. (And its negation.) And {0}|{1,1/2,1/3,1/4,...} which is an infinitesimal number, positive but smaller than any ratio of positive integers. And you can then proceed further and construct a vast infinitude of numbers, including all the real numbers (which we've already made) and all of the so-called infinite ordinals (which you can kinda think of as being a sort of "infinite positive integer", though there's more to them than that) and much more, all in a system that lets you do arithmetic and suchlike. It's very elegant, if your brain has been twisted into the mathematician-y shape that finds such things elegant.
For the infinitesimal number, I think it makes more sense to use {0}|{1,1/2,1/4,1/8,...} since it gets born at the same day as say 1/3. So it is easier to understand how it arises without "waiting" for all reals.
First: the construction of the real numbers from (traditionally) the rational numbers by means of "Dedekind cuts" (sometimes called "Dedekind sections"). The idea is that if you're trying to build up the machinery of mathematics from scratch, it's not too hard to go step by step from (say) sets to nonnegative integers to integers to rational numbers, but it's harder to get from there to the real numbers, and Dedekind's idea is to say that e.g. the square root of 2 is the way of chopping the rational numbers into "things less than the square root of 2" and "things greater than the square root of 2".
Second: the construction of the ordinal numbers (a sort of generalization of the notion of "nonnegative integer" that allows the numbers to get very infinite) due to von Neumann: you start off saying that zero "is" the empty set, and then you repeatedly say: the next ordinal "is" the set of all the ordinals you've constructed so far. So, e.g., 1 = {0}, and then 2 = {0,1}, etc. -- but once you've constructed all the nonnegative integers you can then look at {0,1,2,...} and that's a new ordinal typically called ω, and then you can take {0,1,2,...,ω} and call it ω+1, and so on and so forth.
Both of these are special cases of what Conway does: Dedekind's is the case where all the numbers are rational numbers and you don't allow either set to be empty, and von Neumann's is where you _require_ the right-hand set to be empty.
There's a further connection, which I believe is how Conway found these things in the first place: if in the definition of surreal numbers you delete the requirement that everything in L has to be less than everything in R, then what you've got is (more or less) the definition of a position in a two-player game. L is the set of positions one player can move to, R is the set of positions the other player can move to. (I say "more or less" because e.g. in many games you're allowed to repeat positions, and games may have complicated winning conditions or involve chance or whatever.) And there's a whole rather nice thing called "combinatorial game theory" that's all about these, and from that perspective numbers are just one particular kind of (position in a) game. (Specifically, a number is a game in which at no point in the subsequent gameplay can it ever make your position better for you to make a move: you'd always rather pass if you could.)
The numbers don't matter and you could replace -1 and 1 with anything. It's just easier to begin your new fake number at - 1 and 1. Because position does matter.
Basically what I take away is that we're inventing a new number system from scratch. So we're not "proving" that 1 is a number between 0 and the empty set. We're defining it as such, and it just so happens that a number system defined this way works out in convergent ways with other mathematics.
Is that roughly right?
Only as a mental abstraction that's based on our experience/concept of space+time.
Sorry it was confusing.
Edit: the picture is now edited into the article.
Some other comments clarify that "nothing" is more accurately "the empty set". This is helpful because at first I wrongly synonomized "nothing" with zero. But now I get tripped up on the "between" language. Maybe it's a lack of background in sets, but I don't know what "between" implies for an integer (zero) and a set (the empty set).
My favorite intro to surreal numbers is https://www.infinitelymore.xyz/p/surreal-numbers, but it is behind a registration wall.
That's a mistake. They should've written "empty set of surreal numbers" and not "nothing".
It is a constructive theory, like sets/ordinals. For ordinals you can use ∅, { }, ∪ and you construct
∅, {∅}, {{∅},∅}, ... (von Neumann ordinals).
For surreal numbers you use the form { A | B } where A and B are sets of surreal numbers. Some restrictions apply so not all of these forms will be surreal numbers.You build up surreal numbers as
{∅|∅}, {∅|{∅|∅}}, {{∅|∅}|∅}
and so on.---
Edit: A happy accident: I denoted the "empty set of surreal numbers" with the symbol ∅. It works, and it gives you the surreal numbers. But if you think of ∅ as the empty set in set theory, then the same construction (using an ordered-pair construction) gives you the surreal numbers as sets!
I’m slightly stretching the metaphor here because the number lines gives me enough structure (order expressed visually) and I only deal with at most one set item at a time (since we construct in the order of simplicity and can use the already constructed numbers), so it (IMO) unnecessarily complicates things to even talk about sets when we’re sort of just making cuts on the line. But in either case I don’t see the problem with colloquially saying “nothing” here.
> (crucially, “to the left of all” and “to the right of all” also count as “gaps”)
So there are two "nothings" here, left of "all" - i.e. the zero - and right of it.
Though I'm not quite sure how you'd get infinite or irrational numbers by this procedure. Wouldn't you simply get the rational numbers by this?
(unless the "put a number" step is doing more work here than it seems. He doesn't really say which number to put there. In the examples, he mostly did "new number = (left number + right number) / 2", with special cases if any number is "nothing" - but he never actually wrote what the rules are here.)
I'm hoping someone develops an interactive tutor that can teach any subject to any depth.
The tutor should optimize its pedagogy. It should use online RL to adapt to a learner's ideal learning style, model what the student understands and to what degree, and understand what the gaps and next steps are.
I'd subscribe in a heartbeat.
- https://github.com/mattpocock/skills/blob/main/skills/produc...
ie. i am an expert at zig, explain this c++ in terms of zig
Universities are great for networking, starting projects with other students (not the ones professors mandate), and learning lab sciences. In research, they're great for institutional knowledge, having a community of peers, getting guidance from research advisors, having real equipment and funding, etc. But there's a great need for AI tools to accelerate learning outside of that setting.
Anecdotally, I'm a working adult. I'm not going to waste time in college again. I need this for me.
In each episode they make a major science-fiction style breakthrough and grapple with the consequences without revealing themselves.
It’s a terrible explanation. A surreal number is defined as a pair of sets of surreal numbers (where you fiddle around the recursion in that definition by defining them in waves, so strictly speaking you’re defining “the surreal numbers born at time T” for each individual T given access to the surreal numbers born at all earlier times, and then you “take the union across all times”, scare quotes because there are too many times for this to result in a set). Zero is a surreal number but the LLM is using the word “zero” to mean “the set containing just the surreal number 0”; “nothing” here is the LLM’s obtuse word for the empty set. Wikipedia may actually be easier to follow.
> We may say that Cantor was only interested in moving ever rightwards, whereas Dedekind stopped to fill in the gaps, so that R was always empty for Cantor, never empty for Dedekind. It is remarkable that by dropping these restrictions we obtain a theory that is both more general and more easy to work with.
This is precisely the intuition I present to the reader of the article. I am relying on visual aid (concretely, the ordered number line) to imply the machinery explicit in the actual recursive definition. The intended reader of this article is not a mathematician, and I think intuition is vastly more important here.
And I don't think I'm conflating 0 with {0} as you claim. When I say zero is "between nothing and nothing", I mean 0 := {|}. When I say one is "between zero and nothing", I mean 1 := {0|}. When I say 1/2 is "between 0 and 1", I mean 1/2 := {0|1}. And so on. I elide "the simplest number" because I am already going in the order of simplicity. I do not need to explain that alternative spellings like 1/2 = {0.2 | 1} are valid because it is not relevant to establishing the mental model of birthdays.
For the finite cases in my explanation, I do not need to explain that the left and the right parts form sets because I only ever need at most one surreal on either side to define the next generation. I also do not need to state the left/right order condition because it is already visually implied by the picture. For the same reason, I do not need to explicitly quantify over the set of earlier-born surreals, since in these finite cases, if we go birthday by birthday, each next day's surreals are definable via the numbers already constructed by the previous day.
I agree that these finite examples don't spell out how to handle infinitely many bounds at the omega-th day, which is where I believe the illustration embedded below is more helpful. I still think "a gap beyond 0, 1, 2, 3, ... with nothing on the right" is a useful intuition when we get there.
For a more precise but accessible treatment, I think https://www.infinitelymore.xyz/p/surreal-numbers is much clearer than Wikipedia.
“Doing better than a totally useless explanation in fewer characters” is in general impossible, of course, eg if the first explanation has only one character.
and "proof map": https://gaearon.github.io/conway-refinement/#/map/conway-ref...