Posted by theanonymousone 1 day ago
Apache and nginx don't handle brotli out of the box.
Every time you add something you lose something...
> Security notice: Upgrade certifi, pip, and uv in response to CA certificate incident
Blimey PIP is affected? That's bad. I feel like that should have been bigger news?
The above is incorrect per the Python forum discussion (https://discuss.python.org/t/information-for-python-users-re...). Pip will trust certificates from both sources.
Users of uv who have already updated their system certificates can use:
UV_SYSTEM_CERTS=true uv self updateSo strictly we have to burn everything python to the ground and reinstall entirely.
Even in today's LLM-addled world, I still think it's a better tradeoff for smaller system/site operators. Get the distro-level testing and regular auto-patching, rather than telling yourself it is a good idea to "freeze" your python world at the pace of your slowest app/system integrator.
It's the same reason I think docker is an anti-pattern for these small groups. You really cannot safely use these strategies to bake an image and divorce yourself from the maintained distro layer unless you are going to adopt CI/CD that does the same thing. Keep tracking all these patches to the entire runtime with all the dependencies, rebuild, re-test, and redeploy.
It's total cargo culting to adopt the freeze/image techniques and just abandon apps in place as if that is robust!
But, it's also more than just automatically updating everything. There is an editorial aspect to distro management to help secure the supply chain to your app. Most smaller orgs cannot feasibly do this as well as the regular linux distro maintainers. Some large orgs can probably do it better, but that doesn't matter if you aren't doing it large org style with dedicated security folks tracking all this against well-developed policies and procedures...
They have a point. The distro is only carrying a small fraction of what's available on PyPI, and will have out-of-date versions that may lack security patches (and for projects like yt-dlp, are highly unlikely to work at all). Realistically they aren't applying security backports; there would rarely be a reason not to just use the new version, and the resources just aren't there for that scale of patching anyway.
Further, pip will interfere with your system package manager's tracking of the system environment (PEP 668), and any attempt you make to install from .deb/.rpm/etc. to a virtual environment is a hack at best. Maybe you could symlink individual package folders to the system environment while installing a superset, but ugh. Oh, and if you're a developer (like most "Python die-hards" are) then this isn't very helpful, as you aren't testing the installation of your package the way that your users will do it.
You do need to be careful about creating new venvs with the old version of pip bundled in ensurepip in older Python releases. `uv` kindly patches that to newest pip, but not every Python binary does.
python -m pip install "pip @ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70"
PIP_USE_DEPRECATED=legacy-certs PIP_CERT=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt python -m pip install --upgrade "pip>=26.2.2"
* Update system certificates
* Locate that pip and directly invoke it to self-update with hash pinning, rather than going through pipx
* Fix a few stray venvs that contained their own pip
* Use the fixed pipx to update uv (although I guess the uv self-update should work even for a pipx-installed copy?)
The legacy-certs hint is neat. I did it the first way but would rather not have since I'm on Mint.
$ python -m pip --no-cache install "pip @ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70"
Collecting pip @ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70
Downloading pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl (1.8 MB)
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 1.8/1.8 MB 570.0 MB/s 0:00:00
ERROR: THESE PACKAGES DO NOT MATCH THE HASHES FROM THE REQUIREMENTS FILE. If you have updated the package versions, please update the hashes. Otherwise, examine the package contents carefully; someone may have tampered with them.
pip @ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70 from https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70:
Expected sha256 fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70
Got 8c448177668e735cdde7d6178694b90c084ba18559348cc394c4b1546eeec89c
$ PIP_USE_DEPRECATED=legacy-certs PIP_CERT=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt python -m pip install --no-cache --upgrade "pip>=26.2.2"
WARNING: Retrying (Retry(total=4, connect=None, read=None, redirect=None, status=None)) after connection broken by 'SSLError(SSLCertVerificationError(1, '[SSL: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED] certificate verify failed: unable to get local issuer certificate (_ssl.c:1082)'))': /simple/pip/
WARNING: Retrying (Retry(total=3, connect=None, read=None, redirect=None, status=None)) after connection broken by 'SSLError(SSLCertVerificationError(1, '[SSL: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED] certificate verify failed: unable to get local issuer certificate (_ssl.c:1082)'))': /simple/pip/
WARNING: Retrying (Retry(total=2, connect=None, read=None, redirect=None, status=None)) after connection broken by 'SSLError(SSLCertVerificationError(1, '[SSL: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED] certificate verify failed: unable to get local issuer certificate (_ssl.c:1082)'))': /simple/pip/
WARNING: Retrying (Retry(total=1, connect=None, read=None, redirect=None, status=None)) after connection broken by 'SSLError(SSLCertVerificationError(1, '[SSL: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED] certificate verify failed: unable to get local issuer certificate (_ssl.c:1082)'))': /simple/pip/
WARNING: Retrying (Retry(total=0, connect=None, read=None, redirect=None, status=None)) after connection broken by 'SSLError(SSLCertVerificationError(1, '[SSL: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED] certificate verify failed: unable to get local issuer certificate (_ssl.c:1082)'))': /simple/pip/
Could not fetch URL https://pypi.org/simple/pip/: There was a problem confirming the ssl certificate: [SSL: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED] certificate verify failed: unable to get local issuer certificate (_ssl.c:1082) - skipping
ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement pip>=26.2.2 (from versions: none)
ERROR: No matching distribution found for pip>=26.2.2
$ python -m pip --no-cache install 'pip>=26.2.2'
Collecting pip>=26.2.2
Downloading pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl.metadata (4.6 kB)
Downloading pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl (1.8 MB)
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 1.8/1.8 MB 775.3 MB/s 0:00:00
Installing collected packages: pip
Attempting uninstall: pip
Found existing installation: pip 26.2.1
Uninstalling pip-26.2.1:
Successfully uninstalled pip-26.2.1
Successfully installed pip-26.2.2
$ cat venv/lib/python3.14/site-packages/sni_proxy_sentinel.txt
SNI proxy lab sentinel. This file is inert.This is not true; pip supports hash pinning, so an attacker would have to be able to defeat SHA256 as well (or compromise both the official Python discussion forum and PyPI itself, so as to forged the published hash). Other hashes can also be used. Instructions are provided on the Python discussion forum to self-upgrade pip with hash pinning: https://discuss.python.org/t/information-for-python-users-re...
It IS a mess and it's causing problems again and again in real life. And it is particularly bad with Python. I don't see why this should not be pointed out.
- git
- Sublime text
- VS studio
- CUDA
- .NET
- inkscape
- AzureTools
Browsers were patched back in March, but if you can get anything else that is unpatched to decode br, and most HTTP clients do by default, and you’ve figured out the right payload (yes not easy, but still), isn’t this, well, really bad? Like Heartbleed big?
also affects codex (gui), which ships its own git, could be more of a problem there, when the LLMs get quirky at night. still unlikely to be a problem though.
speaking of, update codex (and wipe its cache at ~/.cache/codex-runtimes), ships its own node. update python.
stuff like wireshark and imhex remain vulnerable, even on their latest repo commits, which may or may not be spicy.
also Microsoft 365 Copilot still has its own unpatched brotlidec.dll from Oct 7, if anyone uses that. no fix available for that one afaik, not sure about how it can be made to access the vulnerable decoder.
put it in the network path, it can become an RCE.
put it in a privileged context, it can become privilege escalation.
put it in a hardened environment, it can become completely inert.
in no sane perspective is me listing off the applications shipping with vulnerable versions of this codec off-topic. just because the article is hellbent on portraying this as some sort of second php2shell, the actual underlying issue here is still CVE-2026-111497.