Posted by speckx 7 hours ago
I believe the default configuration for suspected spam and phishing and other malicious sites is that the user gets a red warning page that they have to click through first. Website owner would either get notifications from users or notice the drop off in traffic?
The correct answer is probably the abuse contact shown in the WHOIS data. That's programmatically accessible and thus scales
UPDATE: Unpopular because it means there's a lot of work for the owner to moderate the files. And large sites like facebook are notorious for very bad moderation. It's not like we mandate them to hire N moderators per M users.
There's a middle ground for this though. Platforms like Youtube, Facebook, etc, have no excuse anymore. They can literally scan with these models they have available and handle it. So write the legislation based on their capacity so you don't screw the one dude just trying to support some indie game devs in a small community or something.
You've unwittingly helped to spread malware to an innocent person, so yes, it is your problem.
When somebody reports that you are spreading malware, what do you do with that information?
So far as I can tell, the malware uploaded to my site is when people use it as a virtual usb stick; transferring files to a lab system or something else they already have access to. A multiplayer remote desktop site was popular for a while, loads of links to shared virtual machines and sometimes people would upload screen recordings of something that happened (usually social things like someone saying something edgy in a chat that runs alongside). Since it's a lab environment, the users enjoy letting loose all sorts of malware and they'd use my site to get it there, but they always already had access or you can't type in the URL and execute the file
There was one instance where someone did make a self-spreading piece of malware, custom for my site. It would try to occupy a lot of short links, so pretty much no matter what you guessed, you'd end up finding that Windows executable and, if you ran it, it would upload itself to create yet more valid download links. Didn't do anything malicious to infected machines, just a nuisance to the site until I banned IP addresses that continued to spam the site
Of course, that's just focusing on the malware. The vast majority of uploads are screenshots, legit software (matching sha2sum with a known good source), long links or commands someone would otherwise have to type over, stuff like that. On occasion there's waves where some community will decide to use it for something, like rich Koreans sharing chatroom links for about a year comes to mind. A few teachers use it for very short temporary links that they can write on the chalkboard/whiteboard for students to download coursework from. It was down for 2h last week due to a power outage and one of my old teachers opened a github ticket about it, that was nice to see :)
This is an incredibly brave thing to do in 2026.
Sorry mate, the era of forums is over.
A State might be composed of humans but it is a machine, a generally unthinking machine, which projects force on and breaks individuals.
Primary obligation is to the users, not the owners of websites that got themselves infected.
Better than a customer telling you they got a nasty bug from your site!
When I showed and asked who maintains her site, she said it regard to the malware, "All sites look like this"
That was when it hit me. They have won. The web is so full of garbage to the average person that they cannot even recognize it as it feeds on them.
The webadmin is some Chinese guy on upwork.
Most vendors of such lists don't have a contact method, don't respond, or say they're only aggregating a set of secret sources and it's up to me to look for those. Only a handful will actually respond to requests to re-evaluate the allegation, and remove you if it was/is false
> Supply chain - a third-party script file that a site loads is infected with malware, and is then loaded on to the site, exposing all visitors.
I already know many will disagree, but this is far too vague for your answer to make much sense. The list of 15k websites isn't given.
Most websites have at least one analytics script. Some of the biggest vendor names in that space have known XSS issues via nonce reuse that they aren't going to fix because it threatens their entire business model.
You usually get the whole clown car as soon as you allow one 3rd-party script for relatively innocent use cases like wanting a heatmap of user interaction.
You should fully expect that such a blacklist would take out most, if not all, of the websites you use every day. The security model for 3rd party scripts tends to be "trust me bro, we're $bigname"
The blame game isn't going to solve this. Blaming it entirely on the website owners/maintainers is only treating the symptoms instead of the disease.
The scripts should be 100% static files hosted by the same origin and not be obfuscated. They should not make additional requests to inject even more scripts that cannot be known until run time and are specific to that targeted visitor. These scripts should be released in the usual semver tradition with matching hashes that never change without the explicit action by the same domain that the user actually visited (making the nonce obsolete).
Like I said, this is a very old debate with a very simple solution whose only problem is that it breaks the business model of a multi-billion dollar idea. Not only would this tighten up security, but your favorite websites wouldn't lag so hard anymore either. The vast majority of complaints about the web being slow are from the dozens of HTTP requests constantly being made behind your back.
I'm not sure what point you're trying to make here.
Just give them the deets.
This would be an idea very similar to haveibeenpwned.com, which is immensely helpful.
I don't get why he brings "responsible disclosure" into this. That is appropriate when you find a door lock that is easily picked; that is not appropriate when you are watching from across the street while a house gets looted.
Google, Facebook, Bing, other large platforms will get those websites blocked. Their traffic falls almost to zero. Then:
either web admin notices and fixes website
or people stop visiting yhem
either way, no more infected people, win for everyone.
Okay so let's say this is your site. You notice that Firefox gives a warning, you find the issue, remove the malicious dependency and roll out the new version. Now what? Who do you talk to to get unblocked?
I run a site that's on blocklists. There's no coming off of them once you're there (described elsewhere in this thread: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50398014). These mechanisms are useful for sites that are unmaintained, but I'd not wish it upon admins that immediately respond to vulnerability or abuse reports
I can understand that most people are not aware of this though, just a bit frustrating to see the call for nuking it altogether. It's not what you'd do if one of these 15000 sites was Onedrive: you'd realise the solution is talking to Microsoft. Only when they don't fix their infection would it make sense to take their site offline
Perhaps a coordinated attempt with CERTs or a basic attempt at email contact would be a good idea, but if emails are nowhere to be seen and there is no way to determine a relevant taskforce, reporting the domains seems like the obvious problem.
Getting blocklisted sucks, but so does identity theft, drive-by malware, and credit card fraud. Without things like SECURITY.txt or contact email addresses, there's not a lot more you can do to prevent these people from (unwittingly? intentionally?) spreading harm.
Responsible disclosure is to prevent harm. You think about your disclosure options and pick the one that is best overall weighing the impact and harm.
They're already infected - or so you claim.
I get that companies want to use responsible disclosure as a mechanism so it can save face and their reputation, and if both are possible at the same time then sure.
But if you think you're right, you have to pick one and live with the consequences; and its not that hard to pick the right choice.
In fact, if you don't make the right choice you need stop misusing the word “responsible disclosure”.
Publish the URLs that prove they're infected. Auto update it whenever one get's fixed.
That sounds like the opposite of the goal of that procedure, since the point is the disclosure. Telling everyone about a weakness before it can be solved would harm users, that's why you coordinate with the vendor, but disclosure and resolution is the goal you're working towards. Saving face would be a gag order or agreement, which many companies indeed have tried, but that's the opposite of companies that publish their procedure for coordinated vulnerability disclosure (also/formerly called responsible disclosure) so that white-hats can report issues without fearing legal action. That also means that these companies have to own up to it once the issue is resolved, or at least the hacker is free to talk about it
The rest of your comment is right though: for sites that are already infected, being quiet about it doesn't prevent a vulnerability from being exploited anymore
I host a modest pile of WordPress and other applications, and all traffic gets proxied by nginx. I've been occasionally sniffing around for something that I could use to monitor the JS of outbound traffic and give me a heads-up if it smells like one of the sites is delivering something it shouldn't be, but I haven't found a tool for this that I like yet.
Group by country, and let them handle it.
https://www.edpb.europa.eu/contact/notify-a-data-breach_en
But I think you are asking the wrong question. The challenge is how to minimize damage.
You can list them all out, with the specific pages/methods that are compromised and shouldn't get much backlash from the owners.
This is a different situation than a CVE
If you want to be paid for your efforts, I dunno :\