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Posted by werrett 8 hours ago

Fireworks AI security breach impacts Notion and their customers(www.notion.com)
121 points | 41 comments
Shank 4 hours ago|
> Upon analysis of the new data, we discovered that it included unattributable Notion AI chat transcripts used for the Insights feature. Chats weren't labeled with who wrote them or which workspace they came from, and the transcripts did not contain any tool call results. Beyond the words in the chat transcripts themselves, the data contained no information that could specifically identify the workspace, user, or company.

> As a precaution, we recommend that you treat this unattributable data as if it were exposed. If anyone on your team pasted sensitive information like passwords, API keys, or other credentials into Notion AI during this timeframe, we recommend rotating them right away.

Okay, so the actual impact is quite interesting: they did not notify you if they could not attribute the transcripts to you! You should really treat anything sensitive sent to Notion AI as compromised because they are not sure where these transcripts came from.

lowdude 4 hours ago||
In all fairness, treating API tokens as compromised the moment you pasted them into an AI chat seems a reasonable default in general.
hologramofham 2 hours ago|||
> treating API tokens as compromised the moment you pasted them into an AI chat seems a reasonable default in general.

Coding agents in my experience alert you to this, which is good. I pasted what was temporary token I made into Claude, just to test something, and after it had done the task it said something like, "you gave me a live token to work with in the chat, I'd advise you to treat that as exposed and rotate it."

It would be a good standard for all chat interfaces to have those "alerts" built in.

marcindulak 40 minutes ago||
Claude itself tends to store secrets plaintext on disk, discussed 2 days ago https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50407882
keybored 1 hour ago||||
That’s like leaving your phone in the public square. You should expect that it could get stolen. But Mike’s friend can’t go “well to be fair...” when Mike steals it.
RataNova 3 hours ago|||
[flagged]
chinathrow 4 hours ago|||
Yes, and they won't let admins see it either. It's insane.
xtiansimon 3 hours ago|||
> "unattributable Notion AI chat transcripts"

Who is using Notion for a chat about the weather? It's chats about your content and data.

skeeter2020 2 hours ago||
my initial thought too; even if your chat is cursory or OT it still contains lots of PII adjacent information
htrp 29 minutes ago||
sounds like someone just read the inference container logstream and didn't implement wide logs
leumon 4 hours ago||
On Openrouter the Fireworks AI is labeled as ZDR.

> Private: this provider does not train on prompts and does not retain prompt data.

So how come notion discovered that they actually stored the data?

> Upon analysis of the new data, we discovered that it included unattributable Notion AI chat transcripts

embedding-shape 54 minutes ago||
> So how come notion discovered that they actually stored the data?

Is there any legal consequence for stating you are ZDR but then internally you don't give a shit about it? I'm guessing that'd be between OpenRouter and the provider, not between the provider and the one triggering the inference, would that be correct? Does OpenRouter validate anything at all in regards to the providers, or it's a free-for-all "do whatever you want" kind of deal for OpenRouter and the providers?

shalom1112 2 hours ago||
[dead]
edot 6 hours ago||
So Fireworks is ZDR by default, yet Notion configured (asked) Fireworks to retain data? Otherwise, how is there anything to leak?

On the main fireworks breach page, they also say some customer weights of models and datasets to train them were leaked.

happygoose 5 hours ago||
Fireworks "datasets" are used for batch inference as well as training models. Notion mentioned that the leak was due to some feature they have to classify previous ai conversations. They probably uploaded these conversations as a 'dataset' to fireworks in order to take advantage of their large batch processing discount.

https://docs.fireworks.ai/guides/batch-inference

ares623 6 hours ago||
Can you really trust an AI company to be actually ZDR though
3s 5 hours ago||
Not unless you can verify it through secure hardware attestation like with Apple’s private cloud compute system
embedding-shape 53 minutes ago|||
Even with that, you can't really prove or provide evidence they aren't silently slinging the data elsewhere during transport anyway. Unless you're doing Homomorphic encryption, it all seems to be for show.
hedora 30 minutes ago||
There's also the nvidia enclave stuff. If you trust their hardware, then you can also trust its cryptographic proof that the data was not seen by the inference provider.

Ignoring whether or not there could be backdoors, security holes in the Trusted Execution Environment stuff are still being found on a regular cadence.

I'd guess it's good enough to avoid bulk surveillance (and therefore extraction of training data, which I guess is the attack that Notion was running when they screwed up and leaked the data), but that's about it.

Apple's stuff is a similar story. (And so are VM enclaves, which have been around longer.)

perching_aix 5 hours ago|||
you can stop after the word "Not"
bearjaws 1 hour ago||
November is going to be the month with the most breaches on record (most will be from October given 30 day notification timelines).

That is for now, I am sure there will be worse months ahead of us.

SV_BubbleTime 50 minutes ago|
Good. Trial by fire. This is desirable if you want to improve something, it needs to break first.
RamblingCTO 10 minutes ago||
Posted about it earlier today: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50436636

but good that they finally got around to posting something official ...

I asked the CISO if they can tell me if the data was accessed but they aren't answering and any communication is super slippy like "may have been accessed". I need to do some GDPR notations bc of them but I won't start running around just bc it "may have been" accessed

tiffanyh 3 hours ago||
The official announcements (original & update):

https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-securit...

https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-securit...

_fw 4 hours ago||
> “Unattributable” means the chats weren't labeled with who wrote them or which workspace they came from, and the transcripts did not contain tool call results. Beyond what’s in the chat transcript itself, there’s no information tying the chat back to a workspace, user, or company.

This is astonishing.

They’re saying “OTHER THAN THE ACTUAL CONTENTS OF YOUR CONVERSATION, NO INFORMATION WAS PRESENT”. That is not what unattributable really means and they’re trying to assert otherwise.

It’s trivial to identify the organisation or individuals involved in a conversation most of the time, but Notion are trying to make out that because the metadata wasn’t present, it’s no cause for concern.

That’s absolute bullshit and will give people a false sense of security. The contents of your conversation IS the critical information. Notion’s desktop app is very aggressive in prompting users to transcribe their calls and I imagine a large proportion do so by default. The potential for harm here is large.

I appreciate it’s Fireworks’ fault this happened, but Notion’s response destroys my confidence in them.

werrett 2 hours ago||
To give fair credit to Notion -- they have provided the raw data that was in scope (assuming you're on an Enterprise SKU). Along with the initial notification. This is quiet rare for these breaches. Fireworks definitely did not in their response.

So we've all got all the data to make our own determination on the data being 'unattributable' or not.

dynm 2 hours ago||
This is a delicious complement to the reassurances we are always given when metadata is tracked/stored/aggregated/breached that it's fine because it's just the metadata.
skinfaxi 33 minutes ago||
"We kill people based on metadata," Michael Hayden, former head of NSA 2014.
petterroea 4 hours ago||
Does anyone actually use the AI features? $job switched off because they spent too much time on AI features we never used, and too little time making a text editor that wasn't painful to use
oorestisime 1 hour ago|
I run my coding agents on a PC at home, only reachable over Tailscale for this reason. It runs an opencode server with password. Currentlyt he blast radius from all 3rd party providers is so huge and scary.
rbobby 1 hour ago|
What's a blast radius? Can AI actually cause explosions?

/s

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