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Posted by martinald 2 hours ago

World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely(blog.report-uri.com)
98 points | 16 comments
stickfigure 3 minutes ago|
The whole concept of Google Tag Manager was that you could give marketing departments the ability to add "tags" to the website without having to involve engineering. That's how we got 10MB of javascript with every news article.

I hope folks are re-evaluating that now.

tehlike 30 minutes ago||
This was inevitable and not entirely novel.

https://x.com/tehlike/status/1432082161125888003 https://x.com/tehlike/status/1467033965215109122

ea016 48 minutes ago||
> On iPhone/iPad/iPod only: injects boot.js from two .icu hosts and, on iOS ≤ 18.6, a hidden iframe.

Anyone knows what this might be? Can you jailbreak from safari on those versions?

[edit] From the other link, it seems to be Coruna and DarkSword exploits

muglug 1 hour ago||
Optimizely Status site: https://status.optimizely.com/

Currently says "Partial Outage Affecting Recommendations Tracking and Reporting"

pamcake 1 hour ago||
Unfortunate with this nonsense slop report for a seemingly significant event like this.

> Your origin can be clean while your visitors are robbed — the compromise sits in the tag layer.

slopnt 1 hour ago|
ahhh yes, the famous tag layer
bombcar 23 minutes ago||
It’s right above the egg layer.
duxup 2 hours ago||
Let’s say I use Optimizely (I don’t), is there a good best practice to say?:

“yeah load this JS m, but it can’t load / random other JS referencing sketchy places”

Jach 54 minutes ago||
Besides specifying scripts by hashes, you can also whitelist various domains: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP (and https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/...)

Feels nice knowing several years ago I worked on forcing CSP (including removing unsafe-eval) on some customers for a site builder product, as they have to manually whitelist domains which limits the impact of these sorts of attacks...

This writeup https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-w... has a section on how CSP helped (or didn't) in this attack.

1a527dd5 2 hours ago|||
Yes: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Defens...
stavros 51 minutes ago|||
SRI helps you make sure the script you're loading is what you initially thought, but doesn't ensure that script doesn't load other scripts, no? You need CSP for that.
technion 10 minutes ago||
Specifying scripts by hashes is always a solid defense that platforms like this don't change their script after compromise - but in practice the whole point of optimizely and similar tools it that it's expected the script will change.

Common examples like analytics tools happily change their script bundles whenever they feel like it without just tagging a new version and letting you upgrade.

I wish SRI could be used more,

duxup 1 hour ago|||
Very cool thank you.
r1ch 1 hour ago||
In theory yes, in practice no since every SaaS wants to ship 5 times a day and add 15 new dependencies on other SaaS providers each release, and marketing wants to load gobs of 3rd party tracking and analytics code from their favorite SaaS of the day without having to get approval from those pesky security people. Let's not even mention ad networks.
theseamusjames 32 minutes ago||
Every time one of these new attacks drops, you know there's a couple devs at OpenAI that look at each other and go, "This definitely wasn't us, right? ...right?" And how confident are they that out of Outlook, FAA, banks, and now Optimizely skimmer that none of them were either 1) agents up to some fuckery or 2) someone using their system to get up to some fuckery? It can't be 100% confident, right? ...right?
louis-paul 1 hour ago||
Better link: https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-w...
zbangrec 1 hour ago||
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reasonableklout 1 hour ago|
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