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Posted by speedping 3 hours ago

Unauthenticated remote code execution in Nginx (CVE-2026-123633/CVE-2026-123007)(www.wiz.io)
491 points | 173 commentspage 4
K0nserv 3 hours ago|
Just another set of unfortunate examples of programmers who are bad at C, definitely not a C problem.

EDIT: Okay, this comment was snarky and not in good spirit. To be serious, I think we are increasingly seeing that the notion that humans can write non-trivial amounts of C correctly is false. Especially in the face of AI-assisted vulnearbility hunting these programs a crumbling. This is not an indictment of humans, it's a sign that C is not equipped to meet this moment.

marvinborner 2 hours ago||
The patch (or, one of them) seems very much like a bug that can happen independently of the programming language

https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/e27f5fa84fe6e98505e70b...

K0nserv 2 hours ago||
This fixes the integer underflow for CVE-2026-123007, and it's true that the underflow can happen in any language, notwithstanding whether it's UB or not. The issue is what happens as a consequence of this underflow, in this case: out of bounds copy, which is specific to C.
nh2 2 hours ago||
Some languages make it significantly easier than C to just forbid integer overflow/underflow entirely.

Given that on modern CPUs, cycles are quite fast, and memory latency is quite high, always-checked integer operations sound like an extremely good idea.

K0nserv 2 hours ago||
Sure, I usually use `overflow-checks = true` in Rust for this reason. However, it is still true that the overflow is not what caused the issue here. In Rust it would've paniced on the out of bounds copy, even with `overflow-checks = false`.
danisw 2 hours ago|||
[dead]
stevefan1999 2 hours ago||
I think you forgot the /s

C is like a Winchester Model 1897, not saying that it is a bad gun, it is what we call it the good ol' Trench gun, as it ran over the war tunnels of the Great War, and it still packs a punch today, but it only has a half-cock for some level of safety, and there is no trigger disconnector either, so you can easily slam fire it. So it is way too easy to shoot yourself in the foot.

Nowadays we like going for a AKM/AK74, for something maybe more complicated but far more reliable at the same time. That's why we want Rust.

K0nserv 1 hour ago||
I didn't think the /s was necessary
sebiw 3 hours ago||
Uhm, am I missing something or are the patched releases not out yet? Why disclose this level of detail when the patches are not ready yet?

Edit: All good. They released the new versions within 30 mins.

CER10TY 3 hours ago||
Well the fix for this seemingly already landed in the repo last week: https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/e27f5fa84fe6e98505e70b...

Given how common it's become to constantly scan popular repos for n-days, I expect someone will have already picked it up and started work on an exploit. The workaround for this (disabling HTTP/2) is also comparatively easy to what we had with PHP2Shell just a few weeks back, so I think it makes sense to release this.

ferngodfather 2 hours ago||
> Given how common it's become to constantly scan popular repos for n-days

We have people doing this on my side project and then reporting the fixed issues to try and get CVE 'credit'. Tiring.

derhuerst 3 hours ago|||
Currently, the Ubuntu [1] & Debian [2] packages seem unpatched.

[1] https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/nginx [2] https://tracker.debian.org/pkg/nginx

ROllerozxa 3 hours ago||
Yeah I'm not quite sure what is going on with Debian, I would have hoped that this vulnerability would have been disclosed in collaboration with Linux distros to get a patch out?
mjhagen 3 hours ago|||
Upstream fixes are available in 1.30.7 stable and 1.31.9 mainline.
GrayShade 3 hours ago|||
They're out now.
Bender 3 hours ago|||
[dead]
superkuh 3 hours ago||
It seems like it always HTTP/2 (except when it's regex) with nginx. Glad I'm http/1.1 only.
citrin_ru 2 hours ago|
Not surprising given how complex HTTP/2 is. Complexity is the enemy of security.

See also: https://queue.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2732266.2716278

ronfriedhaber 3 hours ago||
Great work by wiz.
FAYSAL-KA 1 hour ago||
i dont know what it is this but good work
hollerith 2 hours ago||
HTTP/2 is so complicated that the code that handles it tends to be vulnerable. What a surprise
acdha 1 hour ago||
This doesn’t seem very HTTP/2 specific, though, and it seems more like the conclusion should be “don’t use C for things which matter”. It’s not like HTTP pipelining and keepalives didn’t have plenty of edge cases to worry about.
basilikum 54 minutes ago||
True, but offering three different protocols with different code paths for the same thing is a lot more attack surface. If you start factoring in different compression methods things look even worse.
dist-epoch 1 hour ago||
Caddy also supports HTTP/2 and it's not affected.

In fact in general there were waaay less CVEs for Caddy lately compared to nginx

Imustaskforhelp 2 hours ago||
Okay now I believe that AI is finally burning down the internet and that all the incidents are not just pure coincidences.

Some of these things could've been coincidence but I remember seeing an apache RCE a few days back and people said, oh imagine using Apache, I use Nginx and now not a few days later Nginx has RCE.

And this is just a very very small iceberg of all the recent RCE cases with a serious uptick that I have just observed on Hackernews alone.

Basically, there is a sort of justification that people provide with one RCE is that that software X has had issues and to use Y software, but now that X,Y software and A1...Z1 all are being found to have quite severe bugs. I can't in good faith just consider it to be a coincidence.

Though I do still hope that this might just be a coincidence and not a recurring pattern, because, A) I don't wish to live in that reality where each software that we trusted seems to have quite so many bugs and which would be exploited and B) Have it be continued for a prolonged period of time.

Though the plus point is that we are gonna find extremely resilient software after all of this hopefully as sort of a need in our times.

We might have to agree that the cybersecurity world seems to have changed (though I am no expert right now to comment on it but I am curious what experts think)

origini 2 hours ago||
It was clear a year ago already.

Theh people laughing at Anthropic and co for being cautios of Mythos just didn't understand whats happening.

Instead of finding, hiring and then finding security issues, you can throw money and compute at it. This alone is a complete game changer. Combined with models which are very very capable.

This can be potentially the death of certain programming lanugages or requirement of a complete rewrite. It can mean that only big companies have the resources and capacity to continue playing this game.

dist-epoch 1 hour ago||
Imagine using Nginx
johnbellone 3 hours ago||
The beatings will continue until morale improves.
lostmsu 3 hours ago||
All system critical software must be rewritten in memory-safe languages before the end of the year.
mxuribe 3 hours ago||
Wow, that sounds eerily like leadership at my $dayjob! :-D lol Or, maybe that is default way of thinking for many leaders nowadays!?! :-(
Twirrim 2 hours ago||
Even the US federal government (CISA and NSA) have been strongly advising companies to transition to memory safe languages for a couple of years now. https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Pre... (one of the goals of such advisories is it acts as a signal to the industry that in several years this will become a mandatory requirement around purchasing decisions)

We've literally decades of evidence that we cannot write software securely in languages that aren't memory safe, for all sorts of reasons (and it's wrong to look at it as a developer competence issue, even though sometimes that's going to be the case, even extremely experienced and highly competent engineers write memory safety bugs in critical code we rely on day in day out.). Not leaving yourself open to such problems is an entirely logical conclusion. We know a large percentage of vulnerabilities in software are caused by it[1]

Pick a language that doesn't have these risk factors, or pick an enforceable subset of one that makes such impossible.

"Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results."

[1] https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/memory-safet... 70% of Chrome vulnerabilities caused by it. Similar stories for Microsoft products https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/mas... and Mozilla: https://hacks.mozilla.org/2019/02/rewriting-a-browser-compon.... Curl is at 40%, and dropping because Daniel Stenberg has provided various helpers that avoid it (and I believe they've now migrated almost everything over to them) https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2023/12/13/making-it-harder-to-d..., so there are definitely ways to do it, we just... don't.

Agataproximadev 1 hour ago|
[flagged]