Posted by dotcoma 11 hours ago
* Discuss the issue with google keyboard privacy
* Discuss the issue with the google translate API
* Release all of the backend automation code for their infra that runs signal
That said: periodic reminder that Signal cannot protect you from your chat partners' devices. You might have this protection enabled, but if your chat partner has it disabled, their OS's AI can now read your chats.
Signal feels like a begrudging partner in this, not someone who has your back. I love Signal but they have a lot of work to do. It was only recently that (and too late for me) that they could even backup the last 90s of chats when sending in a device for repair. It feels like they hate users. Why is WhatsApp (which harvests your entire address book to meta) still have a better experience?
Signal does keep the message history in an encrypted sqlite file.
Unfortunately they store the key in plaintext alongside it.
what a sad day for hackernews
The smart play is to have companies in many countries and have them federate traffic across each others infra (like tor) and to have third-party clients with their own ability to implement the E2EE bits...
- or, even better: use something like Matrix amongst friends, you only need a slightly technical friend to set it up for you and now it's really hard for someone to violate your trust, and you're not even a big target for mass surveillance: win-win.
As it stands, Signal can still be compelled to act against their users, especially those not under US jurisdiction, and they're forbidden from talking about it. They're directly under the CLOUD act (if they're not a honeypot designed explicitly to drown out other private messengers, which sounds conspiratorial but its the only thing that makes sense based on how effective their marketing is compared to others- the concerns raised against Signal would kill other messengers).
The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.
My general impression is that Signal is about as secure as I can reasonably expect, but that the entire ecosystem is compromised because it's going through two companies that are beholden to the US government.
Ah yes, I do remember: https://soatok.blog/2024/08/14/security-issues-in-matrixs-ol...
As for Signal being open source (or your claim in the link that it is not open source as in they don't provide the source for builds; and you only need to look at the client source for the security claims), as of a previous post about Signal on HN I have started verifying the builds on iOS which I can confirm are fully source reproducible:
https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verificati...
Signal already provide instructions on Android reproducible builds and it wouldn't really take much to extend that to fully source reproducible.
It's a stupid take that the country matters. If the tech is sound and trustless, it won't matter what country the company is based in.
Similarly "digital sovereignty" is stupid. E2EE is what matters. And SimpleX shows that you can essentially add highly effective client-side metadata encryption.
For content privacy, you're much better off with an E2EE file service hosted in North Korea than non-E2EE file service in Switzerland.
Technology must work around this fundamental fact, or work within the law: everything else is a perpetually losing battle.
You can't have an organisation providing anonymous E2EE if there are laws that force KYC or CSAM scanning; and you will be hard pressed to argue on the side of fraudsters and kiddie fiddlers in front of the population.
Like I said, the best solution is small local groups; just like neighbourhoods- there's no actual need to have ONE directory and ONE "instance" of a chat network outside of convienience.. and truthfully, it's not that convenient, because everyone chooses a different chat network anyway. (Whatsapp, Signal, Telegram, Facebook messenger-- which isn't whatsapp for some reason, Wechat, Threema, etc,etc,etc,etc).
I think Signal's threat model is more about law enforcement local or national than intelligence agencies with backdoors in the internet.
As it happens a lot of the abuse of our rights comes from law enforcement. So it's a big improvement to protect against that.
I don't think anyone's expecting Signal to be super anonymous when it's run on AWS.
Yeah, I admit they should work a lot more on metadata privacy. Because anonymity is important in messaging for contact privacy.
This is speculation about mass surveillance by intelligence services. If they're in your threat model then Signal is not the right choice.
Single is decent for law enforcement in your threat model, but SimpleX is still preferable.
JWZ site, so if you don't want the HN testicle egg, copy paste, don't click:
Whether this fact is a pro, con or irrelevant to protecting software user "privacy" is a question left to the reader
Different readers may arrive at different answers. Not all readers will necessarily share their answers in comments. Commenters comprise a small portion of readers
The problem is that this is also what someone not serious about protecting our privacy would say.
Similar claims from big tech ad-companies I support... taking with a grain of salt.
Cry me a river.
[1] or instead of your phone number, give us your CC number.
I want them to accept anonymous payments too, but they use zero knowledge proofs, so the non-anonymous payment does not link you to them. Also, they don't get cc number, Google does.