- Using a terribly inefficient way to redownload the same commits as e.g. HTML diffs, possibly the most inefficient.
- Putting in tons of CPU cycles to surpass the Anubis PoC.
- Putting in other kinds of active effort like reworking access methods and buying "residential proxies" that are probably illegal in most jurisdictions.
This sounds more like escalating DDoS than AI scraping.
AI scraping might be bad, but if a particular case that's actually a DDoS becomes the cause celebre against AI scraping, it will weaken the argument, not strengthen it.
If you're reading this - go ahead and see HOW Linux Foundation spends their money.
So how do we go from here? Is adding more difficult Anubis and Cloudflare bot protection really the solution? How many millions of human hours and billions in infra costs are we willing to spend on this arms race?
Some approaches that I think are promising:
- A robots.txt V2[0] as a standard way for website owners to state how bots and AI crawlers can use their online content and where to go (e.g. distinguish search from AI training use cases, point to a downloadable file instead of crawling everything, etc.).
- Something like Web Bot Auth[1] as a non-centralized standard for self-identifying bots and agents cryptographically. This would allow websites to allow or deny bots very precisely.
- what else?
[0] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vaughan-machine-reada...
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-meunier-http-mes...
If you have a thousands of IP addresses, and you know all the urls you want to request in advance, you can just request them all simultaneously I guess.
The next more advanced version is that URLs are unique to your cookie.
Users can't share urls anymore, but it might be a tradeoff worth making. Unique urls for each user.
You could probably still make this work, if you share your url with another user, they get the page, but heavily rate limited like a regular no cookie request. (a cookie url mismatch gets the rate limited version of the page)