Posted by dotcoma 11 hours ago
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messaging_Layer_Security
[2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OMEMO
[3] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging_proto...
Signal is better than basic SMS, iMessage, Facebook Messenger, etc. That's got value. It's convenient and has reached critical mass so the barrier to entry is low enough that it's a viable option.
It's better than nothing, and just secure enough to be worth it and just secure enough to maintain a customer base.
It's still a business, and they will make it as secure as needed to earn money, and no more secure than that.
[0]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android
What can Signal do to annihilate your concerns without giving you access to their system?
At best they (very) passively fight against third party clients connecting to their official servers.
At best they (very very very) passively fight against self-hosting the server by not providing elaborate guides and having the public repo lag behind production.
The one you download also has proprietary binary blobs.
This is straight up lies, and I don't need to prove it to this specific user, because I already have, but (s)he likes to be obtuse and wilfully ignorant.
For anyone else, full source reproducible verified for iOS: https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verificati...
And the Android clients come with closed source components from Google. It's still not a problem, but it's true.
The build of Signal Server from public source does not mean that's what they deploy in production.
For security analysis the Signal Server is immaterial, all claims of security can be verified from the client. For all intents and purposes the server is just a dumb pipe.
You have no idea how demotivating your comment is for people who have taken a pay cut, and dedicated their lives to try and find a better balance between usability, privacy and sustainability.
There are better alternatives to signal and other companies who aren't outright lying to their users about what data they collect and store in their privacy policy.
You can read more about the issue here: https://web.archive.org/web/20250117232443/https://www.vice....
Note that at the bottom of that article they talk about giving users a way to "disable" the pin, but there is no actual opt of the pin. If you choose not to create one, one is created for you, and that's used when uploading your data to the cloud even though you won't ever be able to recover the data. You cannot opt out of the data collection.
You can't just say it and leave. Anything better than SMS which was not even meant for communication.
But lumping imessage and even Facebook messenger in the same pile is disingenuous.
There are serious cryptographers working on iMessage too, eg. https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/03/03/post-qua...
SMS should indeed not be included in the same conversation as those two.
I should be able to expect basic privacy in my day-to-day chats without needing to spend time/money/resources setting up a goddamn second device just to have truly private chats with my friends and family.
"Settings > Notifications > Notification Content and selecting "No Name or Content" (or "No Name or Message" on Android), the device prevents the operating system from storing sensitive message previews in its internal database. Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."
Until / unless the recipient responds and the traffic analysis detects back-and-forth and pairs your message's recipient with the recipient's recipient.
https://abcnews.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-...
This decision is mine to make, not Signal's. As the owner of the computer, I decide what programs have access to what. Signal has no business attempting to block my own user agent, which I run with my fully informed consent, accessing my own data.
As a user of signal, I do expect signal to prevent my chats from being read by anything other than the other contact.
Preventing man-in-the-middle is different, something you can actually do technically. That is something you can actually promise to a degree.
Either Signal respects that regular people have general purpose computing or they don't.
Over the years we’ve had various requests for conversation or personal usage data, including a court case of some church, and we told them the truth - that we don’t receive any. They said to send that in writing and that was it.
Here was my reply years ago to Moxie Marlinspike about why decentralization is key to provable privacy:
https://community.intercoin.app/t/web3-moxie-signal-telegram...
But really, the key to privacy is trusting the recipient, because one the data lands on the other device, it's outside of your control, and if the user has malware enabled (consciously or not) there's not much you can do about that.
I cannot expect privacy on Signal for voices and opinions critical of Israel. I wouldn't trust any marketing about privacy coming out of Big Tech, YCombinator or Silicon Valley. They made their bed and now they have to sleep in it.