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Posted by dotcoma 11 hours ago

Signal Is Serious About Protecting Your Privacy(signal.org)
386 points | 241 commentspage 2
Bender 5 hours ago|
I will stick with services that can be my dumb pipe and use E2EE libraries that can do MLS [1], OMEMO [2], OTR [3], GPG [4] and manage keys out of band but I do appreciate that services like signal exist to limit the number of governments that can eavesdrop.

[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messaging_Layer_Security

[2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OMEMO

[3] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging_proto...

[4] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard

Flimm 5 hours ago||
All of these are vulnerable to AI tools installed on your device or on your contact's device. That's what this article is about.
Bender 1 hour ago|||
That last droid update did put some AI crap on my phone but I tried my best to disable it. If it gets re-enabled I will force them to ban me.
g-b-r 5 hours ago|||
Those are just protocols, it's the specific apps and applications that have to prevent screenshots and access to their notifications to AI tools
ajsnigrutin 5 hours ago|||
And how many of the people you chat with daily use all those? Your friends, relatives, elementary school classmates, high school friends who still call you over for a beer (and you them), coworkers from previous projects with new leads etc.?
Bender 3 hours ago||
Friends and family use my chat server as a fallback when their primary platform is offline and/or when they have something more sensitive to share such as anything financial related. Some of them know a keyword that means to jump onto my server. I would never try to replace their primary platform.
gib444 5 hours ago||
What does that look like in practice for you, day to day?
Bender 1 hour ago||
Neither I nor family use cell phones to chat. They are gamers and I am a crusty ol' fart that has PTSD from cell phones and pagers. Loose lips sink ships.
caymanjim 4 hours ago||
You can't be serious about privacy with a closed-source app and centralized server.

Signal is better than basic SMS, iMessage, Facebook Messenger, etc. That's got value. It's convenient and has reached critical mass so the barrier to entry is low enough that it's a viable option.

It's better than nothing, and just secure enough to be worth it and just secure enough to maintain a customer base.

It's still a business, and they will make it as secure as needed to earn money, and no more secure than that.

whilenot-dev 4 hours ago||
Signal is closed-source? I can see APGL3-licensed source code for the Android App[0], the iOS App[1], and the server[2].

[0]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android

[1]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-iOS

[2]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server

ostensible 3 hours ago|||
You can review some source. You don't know what's actually running on the production system and who has access to everything.
whilenot-dev 3 hours ago|||
I don't quite get this take... I can't know what's actually running on any production system out there (except my own), because giving anyone access would be a fatal choice.

What can Signal do to annihilate your concerns without giving you access to their system?

m4rtink 3 hours ago|||
The actively fight against self hosted Signal servers and clients - like those where you can know what it is running because it is you (or your friends) running it!
tredre3 1 hour ago||
Unless you have some examples, both your statements seem false.

At best they (very) passively fight against third party clients connecting to their official servers.

At best they (very very very) passively fight against self-hosting the server by not providing elaborate guides and having the public repo lag behind production.

mfro 3 hours ago|||
This is a great point and I wonder if we could see some sort of remote attestation for consumer messaging apps. It would do a lot for my confidence.
nicce 2 hours ago||||
Signal is one of the first apps with fully reproducible builds. Source code matches perfectly the android app and you can get byte identical by yourself. And if client crypto and protocols hold, backend does not matter.
commandersaki 1 hour ago||
Not to mention the cryptographic protocols and libsignal have been formally verified:

https://deepmind.google/blog/introducing-alphaproof-code/

vlovich123 3 hours ago||||
If only Signal was zero trust and then any server implementation would be irrelevant from the security and privacy guarantees it offers.
questionedon 3 hours ago||
That would be a dream world.
lawn 3 hours ago|||
They could open source it and you still wouldn't know what's actually running on their servers.
questionedon 3 hours ago||
And it still wouldn't matter.
LtWorf 3 hours ago|||
At some point the public repository for the server wasn't updated for several years.

The one you download also has proprietary binary blobs.

commandersaki 3 hours ago||
The one you download also has proprietary binary blobs.

This is straight up lies, and I don't need to prove it to this specific user, because I already have, but (s)he likes to be obtuse and wilfully ignorant.

For anyone else, full source reproducible verified for iOS: https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verificati...

questionedon 1 hour ago||
It's not a problem, but it is true. They keep the spam filter closed source. This person seems to be talking about the server, not the clients.

And the Android clients come with closed source components from Google. It's still not a problem, but it's true.

commandersaki 20 minutes ago||
There is no proprietary blobs in the Signal Server source code.

The build of Signal Server from public source does not mean that's what they deploy in production.

For security analysis the Signal Server is immaterial, all claims of security can be verified from the client. For all intents and purposes the server is just a dumb pipe.

yoaviram 3 hours ago|||
As a person working on privacy tech, this attitude, as well as the one in some of the sibling comments is a major reason we don't have better privacy solutions. Signal is not just better then nothing. It's better then all of the viable alternatives.

You have no idea how demotivating your comment is for people who have taken a pay cut, and dedicated their lives to try and find a better balance between usability, privacy and sustainability.

autoexec 19 minutes ago|||
As a person working on privacy tech you should probably be more concerned with the fact that they store your profile info (name, photo, phone number) and a list of all your contacts in the cloud forever where it's kept in a very questionably secure enclave and avilable to anyone who can guess a pin (https://web.archive.org/web/20230519120156/https://community...) all while they lie about never collecting and storing sensitive data (like your social graph) in their privacy policy because they haven't updated it in years even while they add new features like mandatory data collection and optional message content cloud storage. This isn't how a company you should trust with anything behaves.

There are better alternatives to signal and other companies who aren't outright lying to their users about what data they collect and store in their privacy policy.

You can read more about the issue here: https://web.archive.org/web/20250117232443/https://www.vice....

Note that at the bottom of that article they talk about giving users a way to "disable" the pin, but there is no actual opt of the pin. If you choose not to create one, one is created for you, and that's used when uploading your data to the cloud even though you won't ever be able to recover the data. You cannot opt out of the data collection.

m4rtink 3 hours ago|||
It is still valid to point out the false sense of security, not to mention there being an intentional single point of failure (and metadata monitoring).
ahartmetz 4 hours ago|||
It is a non-profit company.
LtWorf 3 hours ago||
Ah, like openAI?
questionedon 3 hours ago||
No, not like OpenAI.
ostensible 3 hours ago|||
> Signal is better than basic SMS, iMessage, Facebook Messenger, etc.

You can't just say it and leave. Anything better than SMS which was not even meant for communication.

But lumping imessage and even Facebook messenger in the same pile is disingenuous.

ghostpepper 3 hours ago||
In case anyone is unaware, Facebook (and WhatsApp) use the Signal protocol for encryption, although my understanding is they don't fully utilize all the security features that Signal does. I also trust the Signal foundation much more than Meta.

There are serious cryptographers working on iMessage too, eg. https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/03/03/post-qua...

SMS should indeed not be included in the same conversation as those two.

Jaxan 4 hours ago||
Is it a business though? I thought it was a non-profit organisation.
dustfinger 2 hours ago||
The simplest solution is often best. Have a separate device you use for activities you wish to keep private, running an OS and software you trust will not infringe on your privacy. Use another device for activities where you have decided the benefits of agents outweigh privacy risks.
sbarre 2 hours ago|
When the default OS of phones includes all these agentic backdoors turned on by default, this becomes a pretty naive take.

I should be able to expect basic privacy in my day-to-day chats without needing to spend time/money/resources setting up a goddamn second device just to have truly private chats with my friends and family.

dustfinger 2 hours ago||
[flagged]
nullc 4 hours ago||
Has signal ever commented on the fact ( https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24191267-wyden_smart... ) that the push notification services that signal forces users to use have been being used to spy on users?
datakan 3 hours ago|
They give a literal settings option to block the content of the message in the push notification:

"Settings > Notifications > Notification Content and selecting "No Name or Content" (or "No Name or Message" on Android), the device prevents the operating system from storing sensitive message previews in its internal database. Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."

RunSet 1 hour ago|||
> Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."

Until / unless the recipient responds and the traffic analysis detects back-and-forth and pairs your message's recipient with the recipient's recipient.

https://abcnews.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-...

genxy 3 hours ago||||
It is ridiculous that you have to go through multiple steps to "harden" signal. It should have a macro, akin to lockdown mode that turns off all the dangerous features. And their electron app should be running the majority of their logic in multiple wasm compartments.
questionedon 3 hours ago|||
They wouldn't get the content anyway, even if you didn't have that on. It would just be stored locally like the rest of your Signal messages.
quotemstr 5 hours ago||
> This means that we are restricting the latest AI agents built into mobile operating systems from potentially capturing and storing your Signal data.

This decision is mine to make, not Signal's. As the owner of the computer, I decide what programs have access to what. Signal has no business attempting to block my own user agent, which I run with my fully informed consent, accessing my own data.

polishdude20 3 hours ago||
Ok but what about people who you're chatting with? When do they get to tell you "no I don't want your agent to be reading our messages"? Do you disclose that in all your chats?

As a user of signal, I do expect signal to prevent my chats from being read by anything other than the other contact.

TeMPOraL 2 hours ago|||
Why should they have any say in this? Once you send a message, you relinquish ownership of it. Same was true and accepted ever since humans learned to write and invented notes and letters. Sender does not get to dictate when and how receiver reads the message, or what they do with it.
polishdude20 1 hour ago||
That's a good point.
quotemstr 2 hours ago|||
You can choose to disclose attestation status and trust level of other signals without deciding on restrictive policy up front on behalf of everyone
AaronAPU 4 hours ago|||
It’s interesting they even try to fight this fight because fundamentally they can never control one side of the conversation taking photos or otherwise logging. That they pretend its tractable at all makes me question their security in general.

Preventing man-in-the-middle is different, something you can actually do technically. That is something you can actually promise to a degree.

dylan604 4 hours ago|||
That is different than having it sent to the cloud with users "unaware" and then the cloud leaking it though.
quotemstr 4 hours ago|||
They could go full mandatory remote attestion, in principle closing every hole but the analog one. This understanding of privacy, one in which the user is part of the threat model, slouches inevitably towards DRM.

Either Signal respects that regular people have general purpose computing or they don't.

crusty 4 hours ago||
Don't they though? You can always form it if you don't like their priorities and decisions, just like those for any other feature.
tamimio 4 hours ago||
Open source both client and server, I can self host server, remove phone number requirement AND any other shenanigans you put as an alternative like payments to unmask people, then we have a start to talk about privacy, other than that, do not trust Signal.
questionedon 3 hours ago|
The payments use zero knowledge proofs, so they don't link you to them.
EGreg 5 hours ago||
Groups is even more serious, but on a different front:

https://groups.app/confidential.html

ebb_earl_co 5 hours ago|
Where did you hear about this? I am intrigued and would like to know more.
EGreg 5 hours ago||
I built Groups, starting nearly a decade years ago, as a privacy-preserving CRM. Since then it’s been downloaded by about 6 million people in over 100 countries. It isn’t as big as Signal by any means, but it has an entirely different focus. You can download it and try it — it’s free:

https://qbix.com/GROUPS

Over the years we’ve had various requests for conversation or personal usage data, including a court case of some church, and we told them the truth - that we don’t receive any. They said to send that in writing and that was it.

Here was my reply years ago to Moxie Marlinspike about why decentralization is key to provable privacy:

https://community.intercoin.app/t/web3-moxie-signal-telegram...

ebb_earl_co 4 hours ago||
Thank you! Best of luck in your endeavors.
aboringusername 6 hours ago||
Isn't the solution kind of obvious here? Mobile devices already have permissions (location, file system, contacts, photos/media), so they just need to implement 'AI/agent' access. If denied, agents are simply prohibited from working. It should be an opt-in toggle similar to location when the app starts, it can request the AI/agent permission during its lifecycle at the right moment (such as tapping an 'ask AI' button and a prompt appears with the permission).

But really, the key to privacy is trusting the recipient, because one the data lands on the other device, it's outside of your control, and if the user has malware enabled (consciously or not) there's not much you can do about that.

kittikitti 1 hour ago||
https://truthout.org/articles/waltz-reportedly-archived-sign...

I cannot expect privacy on Signal for voices and opinions critical of Israel. I wouldn't trust any marketing about privacy coming out of Big Tech, YCombinator or Silicon Valley. They made their bed and now they have to sleep in it.

m4rtink 3 hours ago|
Oh, so they will finally support others to build compatible federated alternative servers and clients, make all builds reproducible and drop the need for phone numbers once and for all, right ? Right ?
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